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“The global liquidity is enormous and only a significant 
disruptive event could create difficulty in the market. As 
long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and 
dance. We’re still dancing.” 
 
Charles Prince 
Former CEO of Citigroup 
July 2007 
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Summary 
 
This paper investigates the change in riskiness of eight Norwegian hydro power 
municipalities’ investments in complex financial products offered by Citigroup 
through the brokerage firm Terra Securities AS during the period 2001-2007. The 
investments were financed by restructuring the municipalities` annual revenue 
from concession fees and power. Using Monte Carlo simulations, this paper 
estimates the change in riskiness by comparing the Cash Flow at Risk between 
two portfolios comprising of (1) restructuring the concession fees and power and 
investing in Credit Linked Notes, and (2) no restructuring of the concession. 
 
Evidence of increased riskiness is found for the eight municipalities when 
entering into these products.  
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Introduction to the research topic 
 
This paper investigates the Norwegian financial scandal taking place between 
2001 and 2007, later known as “The Terra-scandal”, and how the risk profile of 
the involving municipalities changes. 
 
In late 2007, it had become public knowledge that several Norwegian 
municipalities, with the help of Citigroup, through Terra Securities AS, had 
gambled on complicated, risky funds in the U.S.. They were advised by Terra to 
leverage their investments with their future income as collateral in order to obtain 
higher profits (Hofstad 2008). 
 
Records showed that eight so-called Kraftkommuner (energy-producing 
municipalities) were badly affected by the scandal. The eight municipalities were 
Bremanger, Haugesund, Hattfjelldal, Hemnes, Kvinesdal, Narvik, Rana and Vik. 
Later research in 2010 (Forland, Pettersen and Røiseland 2011) also showed that 
Akershus Fylkeskommunale Pensjonskasse and the private investment company 
Langen Invest had invested in the securities as well. 
 
It was revealed that the municipalities were misguided and/or kept in the dark by 
Terra about the various risks the financial products carried (Hofstad 2008). 
Further, none of the municipalities did research on how these investments would 
change the riskiness of their income stream, and whether or not the investments 
fulfill their low risk requirements (Sogn og Fjordane Revisjon 2008).   
 
In addition, lack of communication between the financial advisers and Chief 
Municipal Officer led to the purchase of complicated products such as Credit 
Linked Notes (CLN) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO). These were 
products that the municipalities had very little to no knowledge about. Sold by 
Citigroup (NTB 2008), the derivatives were backed by sub-prime mortgage loans, 
whose value decreased heavily as soon as the financial crisis hit the U.S.. 
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Research problem reviewed 
 
Ever since the story first was published in 2007, there has been, to the knowledge 
of the authors, no scientific research centering on this topic. The investments and 
structure of the products offered remains a mystery to many. The confidentiality 
clauses of the current ongoing lawsuit between the municipalities and Citigroup 
further compounds the difficulties obtaining information1. Nevertheless, the aim 
of this paper is to unveil more information about the scandal and to investigate 
how the investments changed the riskiness of the municipalities` income stream.  
 
As the result, the research problem is presented as the following: 
 
1. How did the risk profile of the eight Norwegian municipalities change 
when investing in financial products during 2001 – 2007 
 
Kredittilsynet2 published an article about how such complex products rarely have 
been investigated (Haugen 2007). Understanding these products will be a key part 
in order to answer the research question. While there has been some general 
research about such products, no research has been conducted on the specific 
products purchased by the municipalities. This paper will attempt to determine if 
the purchase of the products, given the available information at the investment 
time and objectives of the municipalities, could be justified. It is the belief of the 
authors that if the municipalities had conducted independent risk analyses of these 
products prior to investment, the decision to invest may have been more difficult 
to justify.   
 
The paper is divided into three parts. In Part I the timeline of the investments will 
be presented. The risk profile of the municipalities, both with and without the 
products, is discussed in Part II. Part III concludes the findings. 
 
Appendix 1 and 2 provides the reader with the fundamentals of how the products 
work in general.  
                                                 
1 The municipalities have taken legal actions against Citigroup who they believe were issuing 
illegal loans in contradiction to the Municipal Act. 
2 Now Finanstilsynet 
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Literature review 
 
Mortgage-backed securities have and will continue to play an important role in the 
capital market. The reason for this is due to the various risk benefits managers 
receive when they strategically allocate their investments. All the risks investors 
have to take into account stem from the various functions financial markets have 
in the global economy (Jaeger, 2008: 138). While these functions give banks and 
insurance companies the opportunity to move undesirable risk to other partners 
and companies, they also introduce opportunities for abuse. Abuse of mortgage-
backed securities, such as Collateralized Debt Obligations and Credit Linked 
Notes, were among the main reasons for the financial crisis of 2008 (Jo, Hoje et al 
2008:10). 
 
To begin with, mortgage-backed securities were intended to help investors hedge 
the risk connected to corporate bonds; especially since using complex swaps does 
not require the investors and speculators to actually own the bonds (Adam and 
Guettler 2011: 2). As soon as people saw the advantage of the swaps, the market 
became flooded with these investments (Morgensen 2008). Such derivatives are 
the kind of products the municipalities in Norway purchased during the 2001-
2007 period. The growing amount of new derivative products, coupled with the 
lack of customer service and support from the financial institutions, has left 
municipalities and small firms in a difficult position (Hance 2008). One of the 
largest reasons for failure in the financial market was due to the lack of 
knowledge of the derivatives and in fully comprehending the legal risks 
associated with the instruments (Carlin 2008: 278–287). 
 
Eventually, the lack of information led to an increase in demand for independent 
third-party experts that were hired to shed light on these opaque investments. At 
the same time, the demand of such products led to the establishment of shadow 
banks (Krugman 2009). With the influx of such shadow banks, the market became 
flooded with mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations and 
credit default swaps. As soon as the market prices of these products fell, a global 
financial crisis was unveiled. 
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Describing the risks of these products in an easy way has proved to be difficult. 
One possible way in approximating the risks can be achieved by measuring the 
cash flow at risk in portfolios. Calculating the cash flow at risk depends on the 
ability to estimate the future change of the variables in the portfolio. According to 
Hull (2003), variable changes can be simulated by the use of Geometrical 
Brownian Motions (GBM), the mean-reverting GBM (also known as the 
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process) and the mean-reverting GBM with jump diffusion.  
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Part I - The Timeline 
 
In the following sections a timeline from the 1990s up till 2008 is introduced 
(Figure 1). Reports from KPMG (Noreng 2008), PWC (Kvamme 2008) and SF 
Revisjon (Sogn og Fjordane revisjon 2008) give a basic understanding of how the 
investments were accounted for within the municipalities.  
 
1.1. Main resources and goals 
 
The main goal of a municipality is to redistribute resources from the community 
in order to provide a steady stream of services (Lund and Co 2013). The eight 
investing municipalities are energy-producing municipalities and have three main 
income sources3: 
 
1. Concession fee (Konsesjonsavgift): An annual fee each municipality receives 
from the energy production plant as compensation for the utilization of its natural 
resource. The fee is calculated by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate (Norges Vassedrag- og Energidirektorat) every five years. In this 
paper the fee is assumed to be fixed.  
 
2. Property taxes (Eiendomsskatt): Annual taxes levied from energy producers are 
considered a fixed income. 
 
3. Concession power (Konsesjonskraft): The producers are obligated to supply a 
certain amount of production to the municipality. The amount is determined by 
the production volume. Since the mid-1990’s energy can be bought at production 
cost, which has been fixed at 0.09 kr/kWh (Sogn og Fjordane revisjon 2008). The 
opportunity to buy concession power can be described as an option.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 There are actually 4 sources, the last one being “natural-resource tax”. However, this tax was not 
restructured by any of the municipalities. 
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Figure 1 - Timeline 
Master Thesis GRA19003  02.09.2013 
Page 13 
1.2.1. Early warnings (1990 - 2001) 
 
It is prudent to note that the investments in Terra products were not the first of 
their kind. There have been similar investments made by Norwegian 
municipalities in complex financial products earlier. For example, it was revealed 
in 1994 that the pension fund of Bærum Municipality had lost NOK 230 million 
due to speculation on Norwegian treasury bonds (Haraldsen 2007). Six years later, 
Halden Municipality suffered a similar speculation loss when NOK 55 million of 
their pension fund disappeared due to a failed investment in IT-related shares and 
derivative products (Meyer 2003). Reports from these two incidences showed that 
both municipalities violated the municipality laws pertaining to safe investments 
by increasing their risk exposure in an attempt to increase their expected returns 
on holding assets.  
 
1.2.2. An idea is born (2001) 
 
By law, hydro concession municipalities are allowed to buy a specific amount of 
concession at a low fixed price and resell it at market price. In early 2000 the 
market price of electricity was at an all-time low and experienced substantial 
volatility. As a result, the municipalities were no longer earning the kind of profits 
as expected.  
 
The mayor of Vik Kommune actively searched for new opportunities and came up 
with an idea (Sogn og Fjordane Revisjon 2008): Why not get a fixed price deal? 
The fixed price would generate a certain income stream that could be reinvested in 
interest carrying accounts or in the financial markets to further secure their future. 
He consulted the municipality’s own bank, Vik Sparebank, to help him with the 
problem and was referred to their financial partner, Terra Securities AS. 
 
Terra Securities AS was a securities company owned by the holding company 
Terra Group, who had built up a reputation in Norway as one of the leading 
companies in the sales of financial instruments, index options, hedge funds and 
other investments securities.  
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The proposed solution to the problem came in the form of a reversed zero coupon 
swap4 (Reversed ZCS). A reversed ZCS is a swap of future income for a onetime 
installment between two parties. The proposal took into consideration two 
important factors: the interest rate in Norway during this period was at an all-time 
low, and Norwegian municipalities are granted access to very favorable loans. For 
these two reasons, Terra proposed an investment opportunity: Take up a loan from 
a local bank that is calculated against the net present value of the concession’s 
future cash flow, use the future cash flow from concession to pay back the interest 
and installments and invest the borrowed amount in the financial market for a 
higher return. The idea was to invest in a diversified portfolio consisting of low 
risk bonds and assets. Due to the low interest rate environment and Vik 
Kommune’s favorable borrowing rate, this would according to Terra yield an 
arbitrage opportunity for Vik Kommune. 
 
1.2.3. Green light (2002) 
 
The Norwegian Local Government Act (Kommuneloven, §50. Låneopptak) 
defines what products each municipality is legally allowed to invest in, and how it 
can be financed. According to this paragraph, municipalities can only borrow 
money with the sole purpose of investing in the construction of buildings, 
property, plant and equipment. The rationale is that the future income generated 
from the investment should be secure enough to cover the interest payments and 
installments. Borrowing in order to invest in risky investments is not granted since 
the expected return combined with the risk can reduce the ability of the 
municipality to provide basic services to the public. Notwithstanding the above, 
investing equity funds in financial markets is allowed at own risk. 
 
A letter from the Ministry of Local Government and Regional development (KRD 
2013), dated September 20th 2002, concerning the legality of their proposed 
investment plan concluded that the 10 years of future energy power revenue 
trading with a one-time installment from DNB NOR was not to be considered as a 
loan, and would therefore not fall under §50. The reasoning behind this decision 
was that the future income was guaranteed and could as such be considered as 
                                                 
4 See Appendix 1, section 1.2. and 1.3. 
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part of the municipality’s equity. The restructuring through reversed ZCS would 
thus be a prepayment of a future guaranteed income, and not a loan. This 
conclusion was based on the assumption that there was no change in the risk 
profile and that the municipality would familiarize itself with the increase in risk 
exposure. 
 
This letter, also known as the “Vik-letter”, later became the loophole each of the 
Terra-municipalities used to justify their investments. Vik and Terra entered a 
mandate agreement to restructure the ownership rights of the future energy power 
with the goal of increasing future profits. With the success of this investment 
structure, Terra became the financial advisor for Vik’s investments, and 
subsequently for the other seven municipalities.  
 
1.2.4. Introduction to the Credit Linked Notes and Citigroup (2004) 
 
Approximately two years after being introduced to the first deal, Terra proposed a 
new deal. Since the first deal generated satisfying returns for the municipalities, 
they decided to raise the stakes (Hofstad 2008). This time, instead of investing in 
diversified portfolios, the municipalities’ money would be placed in Credit Linked 
Notes (CLN) that were arranged by the American bank, Citigroup. A CLN is a 
security that includes a Credit Default Swap (CDS), basically making it a security 
that sells insurance in order to boost returns from underlying debt assets. The 
interested reader may find detailed explanations in Appendix 1, part 1.4 and 1.5.  
 
This strategy changed the investments from being a well-diversified portfolio to a 
portfolio that essentially consists of one type of securities: debt.  
 
1.2.5. Introduction to the Collateralized Debt Obligations (2006) 
 
In 2006, Terra called some of the municipalities’ financial advisers with regards 
to the occurrence of a credit event. The main reason for the credit event was that 
some of the CLN’s had its credit-rating lowered. No further information was 
given about why the ratings had been lowered (Noreng 2008), but according to 
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Terra, reinvesting in a Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) would make it 
possible to reduce the amount of “badly rated securities”. CDO`s are asset-
backed-securities (Dodd-Frank 2013) where the cash flow to the security owners 
is distributed after seniority. The process transfers credit risk from the owner(s) of 
the underlying asset(s) to the holder(s) of the CDO’s. A more detailed description 
of the process is found in Appendix 1, part 1.6. 
 
While the risk of CLN`s are low, the risks of the CDO`s should, according to 
Terra, be as low or even lower (Noreng 2008). Reports later revealed that the 
reinvestment into the CDO’s was done without a credit rating of the new 
investment products (Kvamme 2008). 
 
1.2.6. Introduction to the Collateralized Debt Obligations linked with a Tender 
Option Bond fund (2007) 
 
One year later, prior to the summer in 2007, the municipalities were again 
contacted by Terra. This time, the municipalities were informed that Terra had 
found a new and exciting investment opportunity that could further improve their 
profit margin. By gearing their investments 8 to 10 times through a tender option 
bond (TOB) program in the U.S. (Citigroup 2013), the municipalities would be 
able to take advantage of a theoretical arbitrage opportunity within the TOB-
program by issuing LIBOR bonds and going long in U.S. municipal bonds. In 
order for the hedge to be successful they would depend on a high positive 
correlation between LIBOR and U.S. municipal bonds. This is further explained 
in Appendix 2. 
 
Presented in a prospectus issued by Citigroup (Citigroup 2013), the Norwegian 
municipalities are shown a nearly perfect correlation of 0.9689 between the 
municipal bonds and LIBOR. A hedging strategy between LIBOR and the 
municipals was in theory supposed to make it impossible to lose money (Starling 
1 2007). However, a closer examination of the prospectus revealed that Citigroup 
had, intentionally or unintentionally, based its correlation regression on the 
change in basis points instead of on the percentage change of the basis points 
(Plaintiff Court New York 2013). As a result, the correlation is widely 
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overestimated and the strategy of never losing money cannot hold since the hedge 
fails.  
 
1.2.7. First trigger effect (August 2007) 
 
When the financial turmoil started to unveil itself in the U.S. financial markets, 
the CDO`s linked to the TOB fund decreased rapidly in value. Thus, the so-called 
safe investments of the Norwegian municipalities started to lose money. The 
losses further triggered clauses allowing Citigroup to force sell the investments at 
the market price (not necessarily the fair price the municipalities felt they 
deserved), unless the municipalities agreed to supply additional equity to their 
investments to a level where the trigger effect is reset, much like a margin call.  
 
1.2.8. Ragnarok (November 2007) 
 
As the turmoil of the financial crisis increased during the fall of 2007, new margin 
calls became more and more frequent in order to avoid a forced sale situation. The 
municipalities, now facing large potential losses, had no longer the capacity and 
willingness to meet these requirements and refuse further payments. Terra, 
realizing the scope of the situation, offered to put up NOK 69 million from their 
own equity account in order to avoid the force sale (Hofstad 2008).  
 
The events culminated in November when Kredittilsynet decided to revoke 
Terra’s license after concluding that the financial intermediate had violated the 
code of business conduct towards the municipalities (Andersen 2009). The 
following day, Terra Group declared their subsidiary Terra Securities insolvent.  
 
In the following months, the investments of Rana, Narvik, Hemnes and 
Hattfjelldal municipalities were either force sold or authorized to be sold. By the 
end of January 2008, the above mentioned municipalities had lost a total of NOK 
565 million out of a NOK 726 million investment. The remaining four 
municipalities, Bremanger, Haugesund, Kvinesdal and Vik, had lost NOK 243 
million out of their NOK 774 million investment. The overall loss for 
municipalities summed up to NOK 808 million on the NOK 1,500 million 
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investments, or 53.39%. A summary of the investments is given in Table 1, while 
an in-depth description of the investments is provided in Appendix 3.  
 
 
  
Brem-
anger 
Hatt- 
fjelldal 
*** 
Hauge-
sund 
Hemnes Kvines-dal Narvik Rana Vik 
Restructure 
fee 
  
61.57 
(2004) 
    
43.60 
(2003) 
52.50 
(2004) 
84.50 
(2004) 
  
Restructure 
concession 
295.60 
(2001) 
42.00 
(2005) 
  
89.00 
(2005) 
    
224.00 
(2002) 
149.00 
(2005)  
Restructure 
tax 
54.40 
(2005) 
        
 190.00 
(2005) 
    
Invested in 
low risk 
stocks 
54.40 
(2005) 
      
10.00 
(2003)  
  
224.00 
(2002) 
51.13 
(2007) 
 Invested in 
CLN 
295.60 
(2001) 
103.57 
(2004) & 
2005) 
231.00 
(2004) 
89.00 
(2005)  
33.60 
(2003) 
242.50 
(2004)& 
(2005) 
 308.50 
(2004) & 
(2005) 
149.00 
(2005) 
 Invested in 
CDO 
96.80 
(2007) 
103.57 
(2006)  
 227.00 
(2006) 
89.00 
(2006)  
 33.60 
(2005) 
 242.50 
(2006) 
308.50 
(2006) 
 149.00 
(2006) 
 Invested in  
CDO TOB 
170.00 
(2007) 
103.57 
(2007)  
  
89.00 
(2007)  
43.60 
(2007) 
 242.50 
(2007) 
**** 
213.00 
(2007) 
 ***** 
38.50 
(2007) 
*Total 
invested 
(Including all 
costs) 
** 
350.00 
103.00 231.00 89.00 43.60 242.50 308.50 149.00 
Total  loss 
(2007) 
53.70 85.00 130.00 69.40 14.00 188.30 222.50 45.00 
Total loss % 
(2007) 
15.34 % 82.52 % 56.28 % 77.80 % 32.11 % 77.65 % 72.21 % 30.20 % 
 
 
Table 1 * All costs: Transaction cost, provision to Terra etc. 
** NOK 35.2 still in BMA Kragerø, remaining NOK 48 (350-170-96.8-35.2) in Hjartdal og 
Gransherad Sparebank 
*** Haugesund owned the hydropower. They used their annually dividend as capital and did not 
restructered as the seven other municipalities. 
**** Remaining NOK 95.5 (308.5-213.00) still in CDO 
***** Remaining NOK 59.37 (149.00-38.50-51.13) still in CDO 
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Part II - The decision to invest 
 
The financial rationale behind the decision to invest is examined in this part. 
Reports from Sogn og Fjordane Revisjon (2008) and Albrethson (2008) show that 
the riskiness of the products increased with the introduction of each new 
investment. However, the reports show no risk comparison analysis between pre- 
and post-investing. An interesting question is thus to consider whether the change 
in risk was favorable as a result of investing. If support can be found for a risk 
increase by the introduction of the first credit linked note, it can be concluded that 
the risk increases for all sub-sequent investments as well.  
 
Further, the reports and product prospects (Cloverie 2005, Libretto 1 2006, 
Libretto 2 2006, Starling 1 2007 and Starling 2 2007) show that the municipalities 
invested in products with similar terms and expected returns. Through these 
similarities it may be assumed that the results found for one municipality can be 
representative for the remaining seven.  
 
Using the municipality of Hattfjelldal as an example, section 2.1. shows a timeline 
leading up to the first Credit Linked Note investment, section 2.2. presents a 
detailed description of the CLN and section 2.3. examines the change in risk by 
investing.  
 
2.1 The timeline of Hattfjelldal Kommune 
 
Hattfjelldal Kommune began its search for the possibility to restructure its 
concession fee and power in the late 2001 (Albrethson 2008). In 2002, Terra 
provided a 10 year swap-agreement with DNB NOR ASA to restructure the 
concession power. The swap-agreement was comprised of the following terms:  
 
1. DNB NOR ASA agreeing to pay Hattfjelldal a onetime installment of 42 
million NOK. The value of this transaction is known as the notional value. 
 
2. Hattfjelldal agreeing to pay DNB NOR ASA quarterly cash flows of  
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a) Fixed amount equal to pre-agreed installments approximating quarterly 
expected income from the concession power.  
 
b) Floating rate equal to NIBOR, plus 21 basis points compounded 
annually paid on the notional value (Haugesund 2013). 
 
 
On June 30th 2004, the municipality decided to boost its return for the next 10 
years by restructuring its revenue from concession fee as well (Albrethson 2008), 
as Terra had estimated that an additional annual income of NOK 574,000 could be 
obtained. Albrethson (2008) shows that the municipality in 2004 had invested 
NOK 61.6 million in Credit Linked Notes (Cloverie PLC 2005-61) 5 and NOK 42 
million in safe bank loans bonds and obligations.  
 
One year later, the residual NOK 42 million were also re-invested in Credit 
Linked Notes in order to increase the total returns. The total amount invested in 
the Credit Linked Notes on the 14th June 2005 amounted to NOK 103.6 million 6. 
 
2.2 Credit Linked Notes – Cloverie PLC 2005-61 
 
The Credit Linked Notes (Cloverie 2005) were issued by a Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV) owned by Citigroup. A SPV has the main purpose of being legally 
independent of the parent company7.  
 
The CLN has three main components:  
 
1. The underlying assets (collateral) 
2. An Interest Rate and Currency Swap Agreement 
3. A Credit Default Swap 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 ISIN number: XS022302035 
6 In reality Hattfjelldal had invested NOK 61.6 million in CLN Cloverie 2004-75 and NOK 42 
million in CLN Cloverie 2005-61. Due to the problem of publicity, the prospect of Cloverie 2004-
75 could not be obtained. For the simplicity of this paper it is assumed that they are the same, 
based on the similarities between them.  
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The collateral is the return yielding asset and consists of a Goldman Sachs debt 
portfolio8. This debt portfolio contains CDO`s, however the collateral is only 
linked to senior secured debt. The Interest Rate and Currency Swap Agreement 
has the main purpose of exchanging the return from the collateral from EUR to 
NOK and to exchange interest rates. The Credit Default Swap boosts the return by 
allowing the investor to sell protection against credit events to the facilitator. 
 
2.2.1. The initial exchange 
 
Figure 3 shows the initial cash flows when the investment was made. The CLN 
pays interest to the municipality on a quarterly basis, starting September 20th, 
while the collateral pays an annual interest starting April 24th the following year.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
7 See Appendix 1, part 1.1 
8 ISIN number: XS0167154680 
Figure 2 – Basic Credit Linked Note structure 
Figure 3 – Initial payment 
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Step 1: Hattfjelldal transfers NOK 103.6 million to the SPV Cloverie PLC. 
 
Step 2: In order to invest in the collateral, the Norwegian Kroner needs to be 
exchanged into Euros. This is where the Interest Rate and Currency Swap 
Agreement becomes important. Under the agreement, the SPV exchanges the 
initial payment equal to NOK 103.569 million with Citigroup, and in return 
receives a sum equal to EUR 14.871 million. 
 
This transaction warrants further explanation. The agreement states an exchange 
rate of 7.81 NOK/EUR. At this rate, the amount transferred from the SPV to 
Citigroup equals EUR 13.247 million (notional value). However, the amount 
transferred from Citigroup to the SPV equals EUR 14.871 million. It is the 
assumption of the authors that the reason for why these amounts differ can be 
explained by the different payment dates of the CLN and the collateral. While the 
CLN promises to pay interest rate quarterly, starting September 20th 2005, the 
underlying asset only pays annually starting on the 24th of April 2006.  
 
Because of this, the SPV will not be able to make its first 3 interest payments to 
Hattfjelldal unless it somehow is allowed credit to do so. This initial credit is 
granted via the swap agreement and equals the difference between the amount 
paid and the amount received – EUR 1.624 million.  
 
Step 3: The amount of EUR 13.247 million is invested in the collateral, leaving 
EUR 1.624 million for the first 3 interest payment dates.  
 
2.2.2. Cash flow to Hattfjelldal 
 
Figure 4 presents the cash flow due to Hattfjelldal on each payment date.  
 
Step 1: The collateral pays an annual interest equal to 5.125% on the notional 
value to the SPV. 
 
Step 2: The SPV transfers the return from the collateral to Citigroup in order to 
exchange the return from Euro to Norwegian Kroner and repay its credit debt.   
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Figure 4 – Cash Flow  
Step 3: The quarterly cash flow from Citigroup to the SPV equals the annual 3-
month NIBOR plus an annual spread of 0.3% paid on the notional value in 
Norwegian Kroner.  
 
The assumption of initial credit granted by Citigroup is repaid by the expectation 
that the annual 3-month NIBOR plus the annual spread will be lower than the 
5.125% annual return generated by the collateral.  
 
Step 4: In order to boost its returns, Hattfjelldal through the CLN, sells protection 
against credit events (such as defaults) to Citigroup. The agreement yields an 
additional return from Citigroup of 0.43% per annum paid on the notional value. 
In return, Hattfjelldal has to reimburse Citigroup for any losses on the collateral if 
a credit event occurs.  
 
Step 5: The quarterly cash flow Hattfjelldal receives from the CLN investment 
equals the annual 3-month NIBOR plus an annual spread of 0.73%. 
 
Summing up, it is noted that the general payments to Hattfjelldal depend on the 3-
month NIBOR, the NOK/EUR exchange rate and the probability of default in the 
underlying assets.  
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A summary is given in Table 2. 
To Citigroup To Hattfjelldal  Rate per 
annum 
Currency Based on 
Fixed rate from 
underlying 
 
5.125%  Euro Notional 
value 
Possible 
payment in case 
of credit event 
 
 Euro Reduction of 
notional 
value 
 
Variable rate from 
Citigroup  
NIBOR 
+ 0.3%  
Norwegian 
Kroner 
Notional 
value 
 
Fixed rate from 
Citigroup (CDS) 
0.43% Norwegian 
Kroner 
Notional 
value 
 
Initial notional value invested NOK 103,569,000 
Amount insured by CDS NOK 103,569,000 
 
 
2.3. Risk Profile 
 
This section compares the risks between the investing and non-investing decision 
by estimating the future cash flows based on the information available at the time 
of decision. As the main goal of the municipality is to provide a steady stream of 
services to the public, low risk investments are preferred. Since the important 
factor for the municipality is the level of risk (Sogn og Fjordane Revisjon 2008), 
the change in riskiness should be investigated. Faced with the uncertainties of 
changes in interest rates, exchange rates and spot prices of electricity, it will be 
attempted to estimate the risks facing Hattfjelldal by simulating changes in these 
variables. According to Linsmeier (1999), the measurement of Cash Flow at Risk 
should be used instead of Value at Risk when focusing on hypothetical cash flow 
changes instead of hypothetical changes in mark-to-market portfolio values. 
Linsmeier also states that Value at Risk is normally calculated to give an 
estimation for the next t days, while CAR is used for t quarters or t years. Further, 
CAR simplifies the ability to coincide cash flows from different sources to the 
same time period. As a result, CAR is used in order to describing the risk 
evolution. 
Table 2 
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2.3.1. The portfolios 
 
The alternatives of the municipality can be divided into two portfolios:  
 
Portfolio 1:  Investment in CLN 
Portfolio 2:  No investment in CLN 
 
The first portfolio contains the risks of restructuring and investing in the Credit 
Linked Notes, while the second portfolio contains the risks if restructuring is not 
performed. The interesting question is whether Portfolio 1 is less, equally or more 
risky than Portfolio 2. 
 
The non-investing profit comes from both the concession power, sold at the spot 
price, and the concession fees. As the concession fee is assumed to be fixed, the 
only risks to be considered in Portfolio 2 are the changes in spot price and the risk 
of production plants defaulting. Portfolio 1, however, includes the risks from 
changes in spot price (by cause of the restructuring), the 3-month NIBOR, the 
exchange rate as well as the risks of default in both the electricity market and the 
underlying assets.  
 
With regard to the possibility of default, a discussion is needed. As mentioned, 
both Portfolio 1 and Portfolio 2 are exposed to the risk of default. The Norwegian 
Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE 2013) discusses this exposure and 
concludes that the risk of production plants defaulting is very low. For this reason, 
the risk of default in the electricity market will be ignored.  
 
Further, due to the underlying assets in Portfolio 1, the risk of defaulting will be 
higher and the ability to measure the risk of default in the underlying assets proves 
to be difficult because of their complex nature. In order to overcome this problem, 
the risks in Portfolio 1 will be estimated without the risk of default in the 
underlying assets. The rationale is that if it can be concluded that Portfolio 1 is 
more risky than Portfolio 2 without the risk of default, it has to hold that Portfolio 
1 is more risky than Portfolio 2 with the risk of default as well.  
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As a result, the following research question is derived: 
 
Research Question 1: 
“Portfolio 1 is considered to be more risky than Portfolio 2” 
 
 
The risk exposures of the two portfolios are summarized in Table 3. Noticing that 
the spot price of electricity is present in both portfolios, it can be tempting to 
assume that the spot price of electricity cancel each other out. But, this is only true 
when the other variables are uncorrelated with each other. Obviously, this is a 
very strong assumption that cannot be assumed.  
 
Portfolio 1 – Credit Linked Notes Portfolio 2 - No investment 
- Spot price of electricity 
- 3-month NIBOR 
- Exchange rate NOK/EUR 
- Spot price of electricity 
 
 
 
2.3.2. Market development 
 
This section explains how the markets have behaved in previous years. It further 
illustrates what can happen in the future and which models are best fit to describe 
the evolution. The following subsections cover the market development of 
electricity, NIBOR and the exchange rate between NOK and EUR.  
 
2.3.2.1. Spot price of electricity 
 
During the 11 years prior to 2003, the daily spot price has been extremely volatile. 
Shown in Figure 5, the highest spot price during that period was approximately 
0.80 NOK/kWh (2002) while the lowest spot price traded close to 0.01 NOK 
(1992). 
 
A closer look at the figure shows tendencies of seasonal effects, which can be 
explained by an increased need for electricity during the winter. 
Table 3 
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Figure 5 –  Daily spot Figure 6 – Quarterly spot 
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Figure 7 – 3-month NIBOR 
The prices tend to increase towards the end of the year, before decreasing towards 
the middle of the year. When prices move away from the mean, they tend to be 
pulled back towards the opposite direction. This is known as the mean-reverting 
effect (Cartea 2001). The long-term mean for these historical numbers lies just 
below 0.20 NOK/kWh.  
 
In addition to mean reversion, extreme price increases can be noticed for short 
periods of time. Just as fast as they happen, they tend to return towards the mean. 
These extreme price in- and decreases are called price spikes and may be 
explained by events such as heat waves, plant outages, natural catastrophes or 
governmental constraints. Research conducted by Huisman and Mahieu (2003), 
Byström, (2005), Bourbonnais and Meritet, (2006), and Guthrie and Videbeck 
(2007) further validate the price spikes. Using quarterly prices instead, Figure 6 
shows that the mean-reverting effect and the long-term mean of 0.20 NOK/kWh 
still can be observed. However, the spikes are no longer observable to such an 
extreme degree. This can be explained by the large speed of adjustment the price 
spikes often have.  
 
2.3.2.2. The 3-month NIBOR 
 
The 3-month NIBOR is shown in Figure 7. It shows that the interest rate does not 
experience the same mean reversion as the spot price of electricity. Displaying a 
downward trend, the 3-month rate is relatively low compared to its historical 
mean of approximately 7%. The figure further shows no short-term spikes as was 
seen with the price of electricity, implying no unanticipated events.  
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Figure 8 – Foreign exchange 
2.3.2.3. Foreign exchange (NOK/EUR) 
 
Figure 8 shows the development of the NOK/EUR exchange rate since the 
introduction of the Euro. Observed in the figure, the exchange rate seems to revert 
back to its long run mean of 8 NOK/EUR and displays low fluctuations and no 
spikes. However, the short trading period of the currency has to be taken into 
consideration. It is farfetched to assume that the development of the currency will 
stay the same during the next 10, 20 or 30 years into the future.  
 
 
2.3.3. The models 
 
Simulating future price paths depends on the models being able to describe price 
behavior. An economic assumption is that stock prices today are determined by 
the last closing price plus some random walk. The same is assumed for all traded 
assets, such as interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices. This 
assumption is an underlying factor for the models presented in the following 
sections. 
 
2.3.3.1. The Geometrical Brownian Motion Model (GBM) 
 
The Brownian Motion, or wiener process, is known as a stochastic continuous 
time process (Rigobon 2009) that makes it possible to simulate a particular 
random price movement tomorrow based on today’s closing price. The model has 
no memory, and assumes constant mean and volatility. Having no memory means 
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[1] 
[2] 
that each simulated price movement is independent of the prior simulated price 
movements. 
 
The Brownian Drift model is given by: 
 
Price Change Process = Drift effect (Non-random) + Volatility effect (Random) 
 
where the Drift effect equals the last day closing price, and the Volatility effect is 
a random walk, also known as wiener process.  
 
However, the Brownian Motion introduces a problem because of its ability to 
simulate positive as well as negative changes of more than 100 percent over time. 
A negative return of more than 100 percent would imply negative prices. Such 
developments are impossible for commodities and foreign exchange rates, and are 
highly unlikely for interest rates. For this reason modification to the model is 
needed.  
 
A modified version of the Brownian Motion Model is the Geometric Brownian 
Motion Model (Vose 2013). Compared to the Brownian Motion Model, the 
Geometrical Brownian Motion Model (GBM) is based on returns instead of 
prices. The introduction of returns allows the model to mathematically be derived 
on the basis of logarithmic returns, which, over short time intervals, will 
approximate the actual return.  
 
Following Vose (2013), the Geometric Brownian Motion Model is derived the 
following way: 
 
 
where St+1 is the stock price the next day, St is the stock price today and the 
variables change with one unit of time by an amount that is normal distributed 
with mean µ and variance σ2. 
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[3] 
[4] 
[5] 
[6] 
[7] 
[8] 
[9] 
Generalizing equation [2] over time T for continuous time form gives: 
 
 
The Stochastic Differential Equation (SDE) is given by: 
 
 
where   is called the generalized Wiener Process and ε is 
Normal(0,1). Modeling equation [5] over returns yields: 
  
 
or 
 
Using Itô’s Lemma: 
 
 
it is possible to integrate over time T in order to find the relationship between St 
and St+T.  
 
The result is the exponential GBM shown in equation [9]: 
 
 
where  
 
 
  
 
The exponential term in equation [9] means that S > 0, avoiding the problem of 
negative prices (or rates) (Vose 2013). However, one important limitation must be 
considered: When increasing the number of simulated steps towards infinity, the 
paths will increase or decrease exponentially - resulting in drifting returns. 
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[10] 
[11] 
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2.3.3.2. The Geometrical Brownian Motion Mean Reverting Model (Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck) 
 
The problem of exponential drift can be accounted for by introducing a new term 
to the GBM model, which forces the drift to return to a mean level. A model that 
includes such a mean reverting component is the Geometrical Brownian Motion 
Mean Reverting Model, or more popularly known as the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck 
process. Contrary to the GBM model, the adding of a mean reverting component 
no longer allows the paths to be changed completely independent (Blanco 2001). 
 
Starting at [5] 
 
the mean reverting model is modified as follows: 
 
 
where α > 0. Modeling in terms of returns, rt, gives:  
 
 
Equation [11] is known as the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Integrating equation 
[11] gives: 
   
 
where 
 
 
  
 
The mean reversion component in equation [12] consists of the speed of 
adjustment, α, and the long run mean level λ. If the value at time t is below the 
long run mean level, the mean reversion component will be positive and have a 
positive effect on the value in time t + T. Contrary, if the value at time t is above 
the long run mean level, the mean reversion will have a negative effect on value at 
time t + T. As a result, this component will in the long run make sure that the 
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future simulated paths will not drift too far away from the long run mean. 
Problems do however arise when trying to estimate and justify a correct long run 
mean. The model also falsely assumes a constant mean reversion rate, which in 
reality is never constant. 
 
2.3.3.3. Explanatory power of the models:  
 
Estimating price (or rate) movements depends on being able to predict future 
volatilities. They can either be estimated from historical data or by using implied 
volatilities - which will function as a markets best guess. Regardless of the choice, 
biases such as over- and under-estimation of the true volatility will occur. Another 
problem with the explanatory power of the models is contributed by the 
assumption of constant volatility and mean reversion rate. Obviously, this cannot 
be a realistic assumption. Further, if the standard deviation is very high, the drift 
will dominate the price (or rate) evolution sample and create a large band between 
the maximum and minimum value. A last problem to mention is that the models 
assume no correlation between all simulated variables. This is a not realistic, as 
interest rates and exchange rates are assumed to be correlated. 
 
In the following sub-sections the models fit to the variables is discussed. Table 4 
provides a summary of the model choice. 
 
Simulate Model to use 
Spot price of electricity Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process 
Interest rate Geometric Brownian Motion 
Exchange rate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process 
 
 
 
2.3.3.3.1. Electricity spot prices:  
 
Previous research points to several problems and pitfalls when using the GBM to 
simulate spot prices for the electricity market. Blanco (2001) shows that the spot 
Table 4 
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price of electricity does not follow lognormal distributions, thus modifications to 
the model is required.  
 
Considering the mean reversion and price spikes observed in Figure 5 (section 
2.3.2.1.), a mean reverting model including the ability to simulate jumps could be 
used. However, such a model has better explanatory power when the time interval 
is short as with daily or hourly prices. Since the payment dates of the CLN are 
quarterly, prices will be simulated on a quarterly basis and a model including 
jumps will over-estimate the prices. For this reason the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck 
process should be a better approach to explain the price evolution. 
 
2.3.3.3.2. Interest rates:  
 
Hull (2003) suggests using the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model in order to simulate 
interest rates. According to Hull, this model is usually used to simulate short-term 
interest rates. Since the investment period is ten years, a simulation of the interest 
rate for the next ten years is required. As the short-term model is based on short 
term historical values, a simulation based on historically low interest rates will 
underestimate the long term mean assuming the rates converge to previous levels. 
Bearing in mind the low rate levels, it can be assumed that they will increase over 
the next decade. One way of estimating the interest rate is to use a higher long-
term mean reversion level. However, guessing the correct long-term rate may 
prove to be difficult. A solution to this problem can be to run simulations using 
the GBM in order to have drifting long-term rates. For this reason the GBM 
model should give a more realistic representation of the interest rate level in the 
long-term as the model does not assume a fixed, random long-term level.  
 
2.3.3.3.3. Exchange rates: 
 
As mentioned in section 2.3.1.3., the Euro has been traded for a short time period. 
This makes it difficult to estimate the future evolution of the exchange rate based 
on past data. Nevertheless, according to the Purchasing Power Parity theory 
(PPP), foreign exchange rate should be mean reverting. Spikes and drifts, if any, 
are small and revert to their mean over time. Taylor et. all (2001) supports this 
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view. Based on the theory of PPP, the foreign exchange rate is assumed to follow 
a mean reverting motion.  
 
2.3.4. The data 
 
The data has been found through Thompson Reuters Datastream and collected by 
requesting contracts and documents from the eight municipalities, banks, 
Fylkesmannen and accounting firms. Table 5 summarizes the information 
previously discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to estimate the future cash flows, additional data about the expected 
profits from the two portfolios is required and covered in the following three sub-
sections.   
 
2.3.4.1. Concession power and fee 
 
Section 2.2.1 explains that the CLN pays interest every quarter. The option to sell 
concession power is exercised on daily basis while the concession fee is received 
once every year. In order to have consistent cash flows, both concession fee and 
power are assumed to be paid quarterly as the CLN. 
 
The annual cash flow from concession fee is found in Albrethson (2008) and 
equals NOK 7 million, or NOK 1.75 million per quarter. The amount of 
 Amount/Annual Rate 
Net present value of concession power NOK 61.569 million 
Net present value of concession fee NOK 42 million 
Expected profit of fee NOK 574,000 
Bank loan NIBOR + 21 basis points 
Production cost 90 NOK/MWh 
Interest Rate and Currency Swap NIBOR + 43 basis points 
Credit Default Swap 30 basis points 
Table 5 
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concession power received is not mentioned by any reports. Nevertheless, 
knowing that the net present value from the concession fee equals NOK 61.569 
million, calculations9 show an annual discount rate of 0.6414%. Using this 
discount rate, the quarterly income from concession power is NOK 1.194 million 
based on the net present value of the concession power (NOK 42 million).  
 
Further, the amount of concession power is needed to estimate the cash flows 
based on spot price changes. Dividing the quarterly income of NOK 1.194 million 
by the production cost of 90 NOK/MWh yields a quarterly amount of 13,264.256 
MWh.  
 
2.3.4.2. The restructure agreement with DNB NOR 
 
None of the documents collected mention the specifics of the restructuring 
agreement with DNB NOR. Nevertheless, Haugesund (2013) shows the 
restructuring agreement Haugesund Munipality had with its bank. Because of the 
similarity between the investments, and the benefits the municipalities have in the 
credit market, it is assumed that the same conditions apply for Hattfjelldal10.  
 
2.3.4.3. Expected cash flows of the portfolios 
 
The expected profits from concession power and fee are based on information in 
Albrethson (2008). Found in Table 5, the expected additional annual profit from 
investing the concession fee is estimated to NOK 574,000. Dividing by the total 
amount invested (NOK 61.569 million) yields a rate of return of 0.932%. As the 
concession fee and power are invested in the same product, the expected 
additional return from the concession power also equals 0.932%, or NOK 
391,56011.  
                                                 
9 See Hattfjelldal concession fee and power discount.xlsx 
10 See CF calculations.xlsx – worksheet “CF Bank loan” 
11 NOK 42 million x 0.00932 = NOK 391,560 
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Transforming NOK 574,000 and NOK 391,560 into quarterly values, the expected 
profits of Portfolio 1 and 2 add up to NOK 3,185,17312 and NOK 2,943,78313, 
respectively. 
 
2.3.5. Methodology 
 
The methodology is based on the similar approach used by Financial Engineering 
Associates (Blanco 2001). The future cash flows in the portfolios will be 
estimated by simulation. The risk levels between them will then be compared by 
the measure of Cash Flow at Risk (CAR).  
 
The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process will be used to simulate price paths for the 
electricity spot and exchange rates. The model is given by (from equation [12]): 
 
 
 
where λ is the long run mean and α the speed of adjustment in absolute terms. The 
speed of adjustment can be estimated by regressing the absolute price change on 
the (lagged by 1) price levels. Dividing the intercept by the slope yields the long 
run mean, and dividing the standard error by the long run mean results in the 
volatility (Blanco 2001).  
 
Simulations of the interest rates follow the exponential Geometric Brownian 
Motion Model (from equation [9]): 
 
 
where µ is the expected continuously compounded return, σ is the annualized 
standard deviation of returns, δt is the time step in years and εt+T is a N(0,1) 
random shock in time t + T. µ and σ are estimated on the historical values.  
 
Using Monte Carlo simulation, the quarterly price (or rate) paths for the next 10 
years are simulated 10,000 times. These price or rate paths are used to create 
                                                 
12 NOK 1,750,000 (concession fee) + NOK 1,193,783 (concession power) + NOK 143,500 + NOK     
97,890 = NOK 3,185,173 
13 NOK 1,750,000 (concession fee) + NOK 1,193,783 (concession power) = NOK 2,943,783 
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10,000 scenarios for the cash flow received from the two portfolios.  
 
The CAR is calculated at the one percent level by subtracting the simulated cash 
flow from the expected profit at each point in time. Next, it is compared between 
the two portfolios.  
 
As a final step it is investigated whether the same conclusions can be drawn when 
modeling without the installments due to DNB NOR ASA through the swap-
agreement. This is done in order test whether the fixed installments that 
Hattfjelldal has to repay significantly impact the CAR in Portfolio 1. 
 
2.3.6. Results 
 
Table 6 shows the parameters µ, σ, α and λ for all calculations 
 
 Spot Price 3-month NIBOR Foreign Exchange 
µ  -0.0623  
σ 0.3948 0.2216 0.0278 
α 1.0330  0.2325 
λ 0.2775  0.1254 
 
                        
The first 20 simulations for the spot price, interest rate and foreign exchange rate 
can be seen in Figure 9-1114.  A summary of the 40 quarters CAR and standard 
deviation of the CAR for both Portfolio 1 and 2 are given in the tables 7 - 1015. 
 
If the difference between the expected profit and simulated cash flow is positive, a 
loss is incurred. The reverse holds for a negative cash flow. Graphically, a 
cumulative distributed representation will show losses on the right side and gains  
on the left side. The standard deviation of the CAR shows the variation of the 
simulated cash flow at risk, and a higher the standard deviation is associated with 
higher risk of the CAR.  
 
                                                 
14 See Simulations.xlsx 
Table 6 
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Figure 9 – 20 El-price simulations 
Figure 11 – 20 Foreign exchange simulations 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
15 See CAR Q1-Q40 (values+graphs).xlxs 
Figure 10 – 20 NIBOR simulations 
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Quarter Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Difference
Q1 1 250 032   199 974      1 050 058   
Q2 1 178 220   128 531      1 049 689   
Q3 1 262 444   149 817      1 112 627   
Q4 1 235 042   141 672      1 093 370   
Q5 1 255 949   213 281      1 042 667   
Q6 1 316 645   226 053      1 090 591   
Q7 1 203 989   128 336      1 075 653   
Q8 1 307 260   191 148      1 116 112   
Q9 1 194 872   110 189      1 084 684   
Q10 1 204 001   108 977      1 095 024   
Q11 1 260 197   155 296      1 104 901   
Q12 1 250 807   165 540      1 085 266   
Q13 1 232 356   140 633      1 091 724   
Q14 1 221 491   122 662      1 098 828   
Q15 1 203 983   87 656        1 116 327   
Q16 1 278 905   214 216      1 064 689   
Q17 1 251 606   178 902      1 072 704   
Q18 1 179 214   108 119      1 071 095   
Q19 1 304 665   203 194      1 101 471   
Q20 1 211 018   119 643      1 091 374   
Q21 1 214 002   114 889      1 099 113   
Q22 1 202 412   111 744      1 090 668   
Q23 1 252 018   175 495      1 076 523   
Q24 1 256 240   168 004      1 088 237   
Q25 1 183 247   76 050        1 107 197   
Q26 1 220 436   159 643      1 060 793   
Q27 1 261 535   211 129      1 050 406   
Q28 1 127 622   127 753      999 868      
Q29 1 222 047   203 476      1 018 572   
Q30 1 178 610   125 505      1 053 105   
Q31 1 173 016   115 620      1 057 396   
Q32 1 201 865   131 662      1 070 203   
Q33 1 172 791   98 773        1 074 017   
Q34 1 158 224   136 494      1 021 730   
Q35 1 138 674   147 045      991 628      
Q36 1 095 734   75 522        1 020 212   
Q37 634 871      134 793      500 078      
Q38 689 371      147 524      541 847      
Q39 658 145      159 473      498 672      
Q40 623 326      96 743        526 583      
CAR
Quarter Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Difference
Q1 732 394      199 974      532 420      
Q2 668 314      128 531      539 783      
Q3 760 234      149 817      610 417      
Q4 740 204      141 672      598 533      
Q5 768 436      213 281      555 155      
Q6 831 852      226 053      605 799      
Q7 727 259      128 336      598 923      
Q8 840 135      191 148      648 987      
Q9 738 198      110 189      628 009      
Q10 744 227      108 977      635 250      
Q11 815 681      155 296      660 385      
Q12 812 065      165 540      646 525      
Q13 799 822      140 633      659 189      
Q14 804 613      122 662      681 950      
Q15 776 291      87 656        688 635      
Q16 876 741      214 216      662 525      
Q17 849 285      178 902      670 383      
Q18 773 792      108 119      665 674      
Q19 900 573      203 194      697 379      
Q20 820 812      119 643      701 169      
Q21 830 148      114 889      715 260      
Q22 826 019      111 744      714 275      
Q23 886 259      175 495      710 764      
Q24 901 894      168 004      733 890      
Q25 813 740      76 050        737 690      
Q26 847 091      159 643      687 448      
Q27 890 569      211 129      679 439      
Q28 758 358      127 753      630 605      
Q29 871 747      203 476      668 272      
Q30 835 726      125 505      710 221      
Q31 832 267      115 620      716 647      
Q32 853 154      131 662      721 492      
Q33 823 805      98 773        725 031      
Q34 825 441      136 494      688 947      
Q35 811 460      147 045      664 414      
Q36 779 706      75 522        704 184      
Q37 835 839      134 793      701 046      
Q38 881 190      147 524      733 666      
Q39 862 456      159 473      702 983      
Q40 809 889      96 743        713 146      
CAR without installments
Table 8 Table 7 
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Quarter Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Difference
Q1 973 780      970 415      3 366           
Q2 1 007 147   1 000 361   6 787           
Q3 1 021 028   1 009 588   11 440         
Q4 1 034 609   1 020 257   14 352         
Q5 1 043 929   1 033 186   10 744         
Q6 1 052 452   1 039 492   12 960         
Q7 1 031 025   1 014 458   16 567         
Q8 1 051 028   1 031 051   19 977         
Q9 1 039 634   1 021 706   17 928         
Q10 1 055 939   1 036 084   19 854         
Q11 1 056 520   1 032 329   24 192         
Q12 1 067 242   1 041 835   25 407         
Q13 1 066 670   1 042 225   24 445         
Q14 1 054 791   1 027 900   26 891         
Q15 1 042 312   1 016 973   25 338         
Q16 1 051 472   1 026 874   24 598         
Q17 1 051 638   1 021 717   29 922         
Q18 1 052 201   1 024 249   27 952         
Q19 1 062 826   1 035 704   27 122         
Q20 1 058 586   1 033 132   25 454         
Q21 1 052 582   1 022 298   30 284         
Q22 1 056 474   1 024 202   32 272         
Q23 1 056 644   1 026 217   30 427         
Q24 1 050 178   1 025 408   24 770         
Q25 1 059 516   1 028 069   31 447         
Q26 1 066 334   1 038 435   27 899         
Q27 1 058 071   1 030 538   27 533         
Q28 1 051 870   1 024 659   27 211         
Q29 1 050 017   1 022 305   27 712         
Q30 1 043 095   1 014 212   28 883         
Q31 1 060 411   1 032 686   27 725         
Q32 1 054 206   1 024 638   29 568         
Q33 1 056 630   1 023 918   32 712         
Q34 1 065 708   1 036 051   29 657         
Q35 1 053 247   1 026 720   26 527         
Q36 1 055 373   1 030 393   24 980         
Q37 1 051 959   1 023 803   28 156         
Q38 1 067 697   1 038 424   29 274         
Q39 1 060 815   1 030 204   30 611         
Q40 1 044 097   1 017 988   26 109         
Standard Deviation of CAR
without installments
Quarter Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Difference
Q1 973 780      970 415      3 366           
Q2 1 007 123   1 000 361   6 762           
Q3 1 020 945   1 009 588   11 357         
Q4 1 034 434   1 020 257   14 178         
Q5 1 043 692   1 033 186   10 506         
Q6 1 052 135   1 039 492   12 643         
Q7 1 030 584   1 014 458   16 126         
Q8 1 050 432   1 031 051   19 381         
Q9 1 038 926   1 021 706   17 220         
Q10 1 055 045   1 036 084   18 961         
Q11 1 055 476   1 032 329   23 147         
Q12 1 065 934   1 041 835   24 100         
Q13 1 065 285   1 042 225   23 060         
Q14 1 053 322   1 027 900   25 422         
Q15 1 040 593   1 016 973   23 620         
Q16 1 049 601   1 026 874   22 727         
Q17 1 049 588   1 021 717   27 871         
Q18 1 049 979   1 024 249   25 731         
Q19 1 060 479   1 035 704   24 775         
Q20 1 056 155   1 033 132   23 022         
Q21 1 049 860   1 022 298   27 562         
Q22 1 053 424   1 024 202   29 222         
Q23 1 053 342   1 026 217   27 125         
Q24 1 047 102   1 025 408   21 694         
Q25 1 056 488   1 028 069   28 420         
Q26 1 063 105   1 038 435   24 670         
Q27 1 054 710   1 030 538   24 173         
Q28 1 048 457   1 024 659   23 798         
Q29 1 046 533   1 022 305   24 228         
Q30 1 039 021   1 014 212   24 809         
Q31 1 056 423   1 032 686   23 737         
Q32 1 050 147   1 024 638   25 509         
Q33 1 052 182   1 023 918   28 264         
Q34 1 061 323   1 036 051   25 272         
Q35 1 049 025   1 026 720   22 305         
Q36 1 051 001   1 030 393   20 608         
Q37 1 047 400   1 023 803   23 598         
Q38 1 063 373   1 038 424   24 949         
Q39 1 055 992   1 030 204   25 788         
Q40 1 039 918   1 017 988   21 930         
Standard Deviation of CAR
Table 9 Table 10 
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Figures 12 and 13 display the cumulative distribution for the first quarter16.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A closer look at the first quarter reveals that the cash flow at risk is significantly 
larger for Portfolio 1 (Figure 12) than for Portfolio 2 (Figure 13). The figures 
show a CAR of NOK 1,250,032 and NOK 199,974 for Portfolio 1 and 2, and the 
red lines represent the cash flow at risk at the 99% confidence level. This 
indicates with 99% certainty that Portfolio 1 will not lose more than NOK 
1,250,032. Similarly, Portfolio 2 will with 99% certainty not lose more than 
                                                 
16 See Excel file CAR Q1-Q40 (values+graph).xlxs for the remaining 39 quarterly simulated cash 
flows.  
Figure 12 – Q1 Portfolio 1 
Figure 13 – Q1 Portfolio 2 
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Figure 15 – Q37 Portfolio 2 
NOK 199,974. This means that by changing from Portfolio 2 to Portfolio 1, the 
cash flow at risk increases with NOK 1,050,058. Further, the standard deviation in 
Table 9 shows that the risk of the CAR is higher for Portfolio 1. 
 
The same results are found for all the successive quarters up until Quarter 37 
(Figure 14 and 15). At Quarter 37, the CAR differences have been significantly 
reduced.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An estimation of the CARs and standard deviations ignoring the installments is 
shown in tables 8 and 1017. The tables show that, even though the cash flows are 
                                                 
17 See Excel file CF calculations without installments.xlxs and CAR Q1-Q40 without 
installments.xlxs 
Figure 14 – Q37 Portfolio 1 
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corrected for installments, the CAR and standard deviation is significantly higher 
in Portfolio 1 than in Portfolio 2.  
 
2.3.7. Discussion 
 
The results show that Portfolio 1 experiences a higher cash flow at risk in all 
quarters. This is further supported by a higher standard deviation of the CAR, and 
indicates that the risk increases substantially when the municipality enters the 
restructuring in order to invest. From just being exposed to the risk in spot price 
changes, it is now additionally exposed to the changes in the 3-month NIBOR and 
the exchange rates.  
 
Next, the sudden drop in CAR for Portfolio 1 observed in Table 7 needs to be 
addressed. Found in the agreement of restructuring, the drop is explained by the 
absence of installments during the last four quarters. In order to exclude that the 
higher CAR of Portfolio 1 is caused by the installments, Table 8 shows the CARs 
modeled without the installments. As seen, even when the effects of installments 
are removed, the CAR is still larger for Portfolio 1 than for Portfolio 2. The same 
holds for the standard deviation. This indicates that the risks added by investing in 
the credit linked notes, such as the change in interest rate and foreign exchange, 
may explain the higher CAR in Portfolio 1.  
 
However, problems regarding the results have to be vented. The models 
simulating the future price paths, which again are used to derive the cash flows, 
rely heavily on the assumptions of normality. The assumption of normality does 
not hold in the real world as extreme scenarios occur more frequently than 
predicted by the theory.  
 
In addition, the mean reversion model assumes constant mean reverting rates. The 
speed at which the values revert to their mean does in reality depend on non-
constant factors. Factors such as seasonal effects can be a reason, but also plant 
outages, natural catastrophes and/or increased demand other than seasonality 
could force the mean reversion rate to be different. As a result, this biases the 
estimated cash flows and thus the CAR.  
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Further, the random number generation by Monte Carlo simulation, with mean 
zero and standard deviation equal to one, are completely independent of each 
other. This means that the models assume that the future path movements between 
the spot price, NIBOR and exchange rate are uncorrelated. The assumption is 
unrealistic as the three variables most likely are correlated. Considering Purchase 
Power Parity, especially the 3-month NIBOR and the foreign exchange rate 
should be highly correlated. This results in over- and underestimation of the cash 
flows.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, the results show an increase in risk. Even without 
considering the risk of default in Portfolio 1, Hattfjelldal`s risk indeed increased 
by changing from Portfolio 2 to Portfolio 1. This supports Research Question 1, 
stating that Portfolio 1 is considered to be more risky than Portfolio 2. Following 
this, all successive investments have to represent higher risky alternatives for the 
municipality - especially when adding the risks of default.  
 
As all of the eight municipalities faced similar conditions, even though they did 
not all restructure the same future cash flows, or restructured at the same time, 
they all faced the same risky variables when investing. Since the products were so 
similar, and the equity invested faced the same underlying risks across all 
municipalities, it is possible to generalize the findings and derive the conclusion 
of an increase in risk for the eight municipalities.  
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 Part III – Conclusion 
 
By creating two portfolios it was possible to compare the decision to invest 
contrary to not investing. Portfolio 1 consisted of the alternative to sell electricity 
at spot price and to leverage in order to finance an investment in Credit Linked 
Notes (CLN). Portfolio 2 consisted of the continuation of selling electricity at spot 
price.  
 
The results show that the cash flow at risk and the standard deviation of CAR was 
substantially higher for Portfolio 1 than for Portfolio 2 for all quarters of the 
investment period; even when ignoring the default rate. Further simulations of the 
cash flow at risk done on the two portfolios excluding installments gave the same 
results. This indicates that the additional risk in Portfolio 1 can be explained by 
other factors in the CLN, such as the change in interest rate and foreign exchange, 
rather than the volume of the installments. 
 
Even without considering the risk of default in Portfolio 1, the risk of Hattfjelldal 
Kommune did indeed increase by changing from Portfolio 2 to Portfolio 1. This 
supports Research Question 1. Following this, all successive investments have to 
represent an even higher risk for the municipal - especially when adding the risks 
of default. As a result of similar terms of restructuring and products, these 
findings can be generalized across the municipalities.  
 
Answering the research question it is concluded that the risk profile of the eight 
Norwegian municipals did change to the worse - exposing them to additional 
risks. 
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Appendix 1 - Fundamentals of the financial products 
 
1.1. The Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
The main aspects of Special Purpose Vehicles is to transfer legal liabilities and to 
reduce risk in underlying assets of a parent company by transferring (selling) the 
assets to the SPV (Lucas 2006). They are new entities created for specific 
purposes and products. As a result they are not affected by previous decisions 
made by the parent company, nor can they affect the parent if defaulted. 
 
1.2. Interest Rate Swap (IRS) 
An interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties to swap floating for 
fixed interest rates and vice-versa. The fixed rate can, either at the time of contract 
signing or at maturity, be paid as a lump sum based on it’s future cash flow. At 
this point, the IRS functions as a loan and equals either a reversed zero coupon 
swap or zero coupon swap (Plaintiff Court London 2009). 
 
1.3. Reversed Zero Coupon Swap (Reversed ZCS): 
A reversed Zero Coupon Swap is an agreement where one party swaps its future 
income for a one time installment at initiation, calculated as the net present value, 
with a second party.  
 
 
1.4. Credit Default Swap (CDS): 
The principle of a Credit Default Swap is to give the buyer credit protection. The 
buyer of the contract pays periodic fees (CDS spread), for example monthly, to 
the seller and in return receives a conditional payment (notional payment) if a 
Figure 1 – Reversed ZCS 
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credit event occurs. Such credit events can be defaults or a pre-determined loss of 
a certain amount or percentage. 
 
 
1.5. Credit Linked Note (CLN): 
A Credit Linked Note is a security that includes a CDS. The CDS yields investors 
a higher return than directly investing in public traded debt. The investor buying 
the note is paid a periodic payment consisting of a collateral return plus the CDS 
spread. The total return equals the premiums plus at least the recovery rate. Figure 
3 illustrates a general Credit Linked Note Structure.  
 
 
The facilitator owns a portfolio of risky securities (reference fund) and wants to 
insure it. The facilitator creates a SPV, which sells a CDS to the facilitator. For 
this the facilitator pays the SPV an insurance spread. At the same time, the SPV 
issues a Credit Linked Note which it sells to an investor. The CDS within the 
CLN boosts the return and gives investors an incentive to buy the CLN notes 
rather than to invest in public traded debt directly. The value of the CLN is 
Figure 2 - CDS 
Figure 3 - CLN 
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determined by the value of the reference fund. The income from the CLN sale is 
placed in a collateral portfolio consisting of low risk assets, such as T-bills and/or 
other debt. It is important to notice that in order for the CDS to have an effect for 
the facilitator, the collateral and the reference fund have to be positively 
correlated. The periodic payment to the investor will consist of the return from the 
collateral fund plus the CDS spread. At maturity, the investor will at least be 
returned a predetermined recovery rate if a credit event occurs and at max the total 
collateral fund.  
 
1.6. Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO): 
 
An illustrative example of a CDO is given before the fundamentals are explained 
in depth.  
 
1.6.1. Illustrative example 
 
Collateralized Debt Obligations are asset-backed-securities (Dodd-Frank 2013) 
and the cash flow to the security owners is distributed after priority (Figure 4). 
The process transfers credit risk from the facilitator to the holders of the CDO’s 
and adds liquidity back to the balance. 
 
 
The facilitator pools its assets and sells them to an SPV. The SPV’s main purpose 
is to securitize the pool and to sell these securities to investors, after horizontally 
Figure 4 - CDO 
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splitting the assets by seniority reflecting each asset’s riskiness. The securitization 
enables the SPV to fund the pooled assets.  
 
The cash flow from the pooled loans are received by the SPV and paid to the 
security owners as coupons and principals according to priority. All tranches 
having a claim receive their coupon in subordinated order as long as the coverage 
tests hold (see section 1.6.2.4.). If a coverage test is violated, coupon payments 
are held back to fully pay of a senior tranche before paying subordinated tranches. 
However, loss of coupons is added to the subordinated tranches’ par value.  
 
1.6.2. Fundamental’s of CDO’s 
 
There are four attributes to a CDO (Lucas 2006): assets, liabilities, purpose and a 
credit structure.  
 
1.6.2.1. Assets (Cash Flow in) 
 
The asset part of a CDO consists of the pooled assets bought from the facilitators. 
Typically, pools are made up from 20 - 500 loans or bonds (Khotari 2006). Assets 
may be high-yield loans, super senior/senior debt, mezzanine debt, capital notes, 
sub-prime mortgage, equity, asset-backed securities etc. 
 
1.6.2.2. Liabilities (Cash Flow out) 
 
The liabilities are ranked by seniority, also known as tranches. The tranches are in 
general categorized into senior, mezzanine and junior/equity tranches. Assets are 
horizontally split into tranches representing different risks for the investors. The 
riskiness and required return increases with the decrease in tranche rating 
(Rakkestad and Weme 2006). Coupons may be paid at floating or fixed rate. 
Notice that equity tranche and sponsors only receive cash flows when all other 
liabilities are covered. 
 
A typical structure of a CDO can be seen in Table 1 
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Tranche Percent of capital 
structure 
Rating Coupon 
Senior Securities 92% AAA LIBOR + 26 
Mezzanine Securities 3% A LIBOR + 75 
Junior Tranche 1,5% BBB LIBOR + 180 
Junior Tranche 1,5% BB LIBOR + 200 
Subordinate Tranche 1,0% Unrated LIBOR + 480 
Equity Tranche 1,0% Unrated Residual cash 
flow 
Sponsor’s Excess 
Spread 
Not announced Unrated Residual cash 
flow 
 
 
1.6.2.3. Distribution of cash flows 
 
The cash flows are distributed according to the principles described the security’s 
prospectus and by seniority. This distribution process is called the “waterfall”: 
 
Figure 5 – Waterfall process 
Table 1 - Example of CDO structure (Khotari 2006). 
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1. Management and commission fees are covered before other liabilities are paid 
out. 
 
2. Class AAA notes are paid before class A notes, which again are paid before 
class BBB notes etc. However, coverage tests are provided as protection to the 
liability holders. These are known as the over-collateralization test and the 
interests coverage test and will be explained in the next section. 
 
3. Interests (Column 1 in Figure 5) are paid first according to seniority as long as 
coverage and interest test are not violated.  
 
4. Principal (Column 2 in Figure 5) is paid second after the down payment of 
Column 1 in order of seniority.  
 
5. Equity holders are paid last from residual income after the down payment of 
both columns. 
 
If a test is violated: 
 
a) On Class AAA, the remaining interest to the subordinated tranches is used to 
pay down the principal on Class AAA notes until the coverage tests are again met. 
If the remaining interest is not enough to cover the principal on Class AAA, cash 
flows from the equity tranche will be used until the coverage tests are met. 
 
b) On Class A, the remaining interest to the subordinated tranches are used to pay 
down Class AAA, before beginning down payment of the principal to Class A 
until the coverage tests again are met. Similarly as above, if the remaining interest 
is not enough to cover the senior principals, cash flow from the equity tranche is 
used to satisfy the coverage tests.  
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1.6.2.4. Coverage tests 
 
1.6.2.4.1. Over-collateralization test 
 
The over-collateralization test gives the investors protection when the portfolio of 
their investments is deteriorated to a certain value. The over-collateralization ratio 
for a tranche can be calculated by: 
 
The higher the ratio, the more protection the investor will receive. A minimum 
required ratio, also called the over-collateralization trigger, is specified in the 
prospectus guidelines. The test is passed if the over-collateralization ratio is equal 
to or above the minimum required ratio Figure 6 shows a CDO with all tranches 
passing the coverage test. 
 
 
 
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate an example. 
 
 
          
  Par Value Minimum O/C Present O/C   
Class AAA 50 1,5 2,0000   
Class A 30 1,2 1,2500   
Class BBB 15 1,1 1,0526 BREACH 
Class B 15 NA     
Total of liabilities 110       
Principal value of the assets 100       
          
 
          
  Par Value Minimum O/C Present O/C   
Class AAA 50 1,5 2,2000   
Class A 30 1,2 1,3750   
Class BBB 15 1,1 1,1579   
Class B 15 NA     
Total of liabilities 110       
Principal value of the assets 110       
          
Figure 6 – Over-collateralization test 
Figure 7 – Example of over-collateralization test 
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As can be seen in Figure 7, Class BBB is breached and the CDO has to be de-
leveraged. The manager must pay off all the classes according to order until the 
OC test is re-stored. 
 
 
          
  Par Value Minimum O/C Present O/C   
Class AAA 5 1,5 11,0000   
Class A 30 1,2 1,5714   
Class BBB 15 1,1 1,1000 PASS 
Class B 15 NA     
Total of liabilities 65       
Reduce asset worth 45       
Value of the asset after 
default 55       
 
        
 
Figure 8 shows the final result after the down payment of Class AAA. The new 
par value of Class A and total value of asset after default are 35 and 100, 
respectively. By re-leveraging and payout par to class A, the CDO is re-stored and 
the new coverage test is passed.  
 
1.6.2.4.2. Interest coverage test 
 
The principal behind the interest coverage test is similar to the over-
collateralization test. The test involves comparing the interest coverage ratio to the 
minimum required ratio. 
 
The interest coverage ratio is calculated as 
 
  
Figure 8 – Example of over-collateralization test 
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Appendix 2 
2.1. The Tender Option Bond Program (TOB Program) 
 
Investors can expose themselves to the TOB Program either by directly investing 
in the program by purchasing Residual Certificates or indirectly through an 
Interest Rate Swap.  
 
The portfolio seeks attractive returns by employing hedged leverage in U.S 
municipal bonds through a Master Fund. The Master Fund applies the strategy of 
“purchasing a portfolio of long-dated tax-exempt municipal bonds, hedging the 
interest rate risk using minimum variance hedges, and leveraging a substantial 
portion of the municipal bond positions using a tender option bond program 
(TOB)” (Starling 1 2007). 
 
The Master Fund leverages the initial investment and invests in a portfolio of 
long-term tax-exempt municipal bonds. The increase and decrease in leverage was 
achieved through a Tender Option Bond Program, a strategy existing since the 
middle of the 1990s. It works the following way (Figure 9): 
 
Step 1: Long-term tax-exempt municipal bonds are identified by the investment 
manager and added to a portfolio, bought with liquidity provided by an 
underwriter such as Citigroup. Based on that portfolio, the fund manager initiates 
a TOB program. In order to give an example of how this works, assume that the 
portfolio of consists of 30 years tax-exempt 4.5% fixed rate municipals 
(collateral) and that the portfolio value is $103.569 (collateral value). 
 
Step 2: The portfolio of municipals are placed in a trust. This trust issues two 
types of certificates (i) Floating Rate Certificates and (ii) a Residual Certificate in 
order to repay the liquidity provided by the underwriter. 
 
Step 3: By issuing the floating rate certificates (floaters), the fund manager 
essentially issues senior notes that include an American put option to other 
investors who want to swap fixed municipal rates for variable ones. These notes 
use the portfolio of municipals as collateral and will have the same maturity as the 
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municipals. The Floating Rate Certificates are entitled to receive interest on a 
short-term weekly rate, or 7 days tax-exempt variable notes, which is assumed to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 – TOB Program  
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be lower than the fixed, long-term rate of 4.5%. The issuance amount is less than 
the value of the collateral, often 80-90% of the collateral value, leaving some 
residual value. For simplicity of the calculations, assume that the floating rate 
equals 3% and that the issuance value is $93.2121 in order to have a gearing effect 
of 9:1. The $93.2121 dollars are paid back to the underwriter.  
 
Step 4: From the residual fund value, the fund manager issues Residual 
Certificates. These certificates are sold to junior note holders (TOB fund 
investors). The Residual Certificates are entitled to all the residual cash flow from 
the collateral, less the interest owed to the floaters plus the interest earned from 
the municipal bonds. They also have the right to buy back all the floaters if 
desired by the owners. The owners are now fully exposed to the leverage 
municipal portfolio. In the example, the fund manager sells Residual Certificates 
for a value of $10.3569, which is paid back to the underwriter. The liquidity 
provided by the underwriter has now been paid back in full. The ratio between the 
Floating Rate Certificates and the Residual Certificates is called the gearing 
effect.  
 
Step 5: The Master Fund further applies an interest rate hedge. By entering into an 
interest swap agreement with an external swap counter-party, the fund exchanges 
55% of the payment received on the Residual Certificates for a LIBOR18. As long 
as the LIBOR increases, the hedge will reduce the return from the Residual 
Certificates to the investors. However, when the interest rates decline, due to a lag 
in the spread between the tax-exempt rate and the non-tax-exempt rates, the hedge 
should earn additional return for the investors.  
 
Step 6: The cash flow from the Master Fund to the investors equals LIBOR on 
55% of the Residual Certificates and 45% of Residual Certificates return. 
 
2.1.1. Example of returns with increasing interest rates 
 
Assume a tax-exempt fixed and a floating rate of 4.5% and 3.0%. Further assume 
that the tax-exempt rates trade at 77.1% of the LIBOR, i.e. 18% above the 
theoretical trading rate of 65% (Citigroup 2013 p.10). Since the tax-exempt rates 
                                                 
18 Based on Starling 1 (2007) 
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in theory are based on 65% of LIBOR, the Master Fund pays more (77.1%) 
through the IRS than it receives (65%).  
 
1) Return from directly investing in municipal bonds: 
 
Amount invested Return 
$10.3569 $10.3569 x 4.5% = 0.47 
 
 
2) Return from buying Residual Certificates: 
 
 
Amount Calculations Return 
Municipal note $103.569 $103.569 x 4.5% 4.66 
Floating Certificate $90.2121 $90.2121 x 3.0% 2.80 
Residual Certificate $10.3569 $10.3569 x 4.5% 0.47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Residual CF 
 
4.66 - 2.80 1.86 
CF to Master Fund 
 
1.86 + 0.47 2.33 
CF to IRS hedge 55% of 2.33 2.33 x 55% 1.28 
CF from IRS hedge Based on LIBOR 1.28 x (0.65/0.771) 1.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total CF to investors 
 
2.33 - (1.28 - 1.08) 2.13 
 
 
From Table 3 it is shown that the leverage effect from the TOB program boosts 
the return of the investor compared to Table 2. The return increases from 0.47 to 
2.33, but is reduced to 2.13 because of the hedging strategy.  
 
2.1.2. Example of returns with decreasing interest rates 
 
Consider now what happens when the interest rates decline. Assume rates of 4.2 
and 2.9 percent for the fixed and floating rates respectively. Keep in mind that the 
tax-exempt rate now trades below the theoretical rate of 65%. Assuming that the 
Table 2 
Table 3 
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proportional distance between the theoretical and actual rate is the same as in 
2.1.1., the theoretical rate trades 18% above the actual rate. 
 
1) Returns from directly investing in municipal bonds: 
 
Amount invested Return 
$10.3569 $10.3569 x 4.2% = 0.44 
 
 
2) Returns from buying Residual Certificates: 
 
 
Amount Calculations Return 
Municipal note $103.569 $103.569 x 4.2% 4.35 
Floating Certificate $90.2121 $90.2121 x 2.9% 2.62 
Residual Certificate $10.3569 $10.3569 x 4.2% 0.44 
    
Total Residual CF 
 
4.35 - 2.62 1.73 
CF to Master Fund 
 
1.73 + 0.44 2.17 
CF to IRS hedge 55% of 2.17 2.17 x 55% 1.19 
CF from IRS hedge Based on LIBOR 1.19 x (0.771/0.65) 1.41 
    
Total CF to investors 
 
2.17 + (1.41 - 1.19) 2.39 
 
 
Table 5 shows that the return from the Residual Certificate has declined, as well 
as the total Residual cash flow. However, the cash flow back to the investors has 
increased with the amount earned through the interest rate swap hedge. As a 
result, the investors earn money even when the municipal rates decline as long as 
the correlations between the rates high. 
 
Table 4 
Table 5 
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Appendix 3 
Hattfjelldal: 
18.11.2004 Interest swap with DNB NOR: NOK 62,000,000 
18.11.2004 Purchase of CLN Cloverie 2004-61: NOK 62,000,000 
14.06.2005 Interest swap with DNB NOR NOK 42,000,000 
14.06.2005 Purchase of CLN Cloverie 2005-75 NOK 42,000,000 
14.06.2005 Purchase CDO Libretto 2006-003 NOK 103,600,000 
28.06.2007 Purchase of Starling TOB NOK 103,600,000 
   
Bremanger: 
26.06.2001 Interest swap with DNB NOR: NOK 295,600,000 
26.06.2001 Purchase of CLN: NOK 295,600,000 
2005 Interest swap with Depfa Bank: NOK 54,400,000 
22.09.2005 Purchase of saving prod. BMA from Kragerø: NOK 54,400,000 
2007 Purchase of CDO: NOK 96,800,000 
2007 Purchase of saving product Hjartal Sparebank: NOK 48,000,000  
2007 Purchase of CDO TOB: NOK 170,000,000 
   
Hemnes: 
02.12.2002 Interest Swap with DNB NOR:  NOK 89,000,000 
14.06.2005 Purchase of CLN: NOK 89,000,000 
12.06.2006 Purchase of CDO: NOK 89,000,000 
21.06.2007 Purchase of CDO TOB: NOK 89,000,000 
   
Rana: 
2002 Interest swap with DNB NOR: NOK 224,000,000 
2002 Purchase of low risk stocks: NOK 224,000,000 
18.10.2004 Interest swap with DNB NOR: NOK 84,500,000 
18.10.2004 Purchase of CLN Cloverie 2004-75: NOK 84,500,000 
2005 Purchase of CLN Cloverie 2005-61: NOK 224,000,000 
02.07. 2007 Purchase Starling PLC 2007-13 (CDO TOB): NOK 203,000,000 
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Vik: 
25.06.2002 Interest swap with DNB NOR: NOK 69,000,000 
2005 Purchase of CLN Signum Finance III: NOK 69,000,000 
2005 Interest swap with DNB NOR: NOK 80,000,000 
2005 Purchase of CDO Starling: NOK 80,000,000 
2006 Purchase of CDO Banque AIG TOB: NOK 33,800,000 
2007 Purchase of CDO Ocelot II: NOK 38,000,000 
2007 Purchase of saving product Hjartal Sparebank:      NOK 60,000,000 
2007  NOK 51,000,000 
   
Narvik: 
01.07.2004 Interest swap with DNB NOR: NOK 52,500,000 
01.07.2004 Purchase of CLN PLC:  NOK 52,500,000 
30.06.2005 Interest swap with Depfa Bank: NOK 190,000,000 
30.06.2005 Purchase of CLN Signum Finance III PLC: NOK 190,000,000 
07.07.2006 Purchase of CDO Ocelot: NOK 190,000,000 
07.07.2006 Purchase CDO Libretto Capiital:  NOK 52,100,000 
27.06.2007 Purchase of Starling PLC 2007-13 (TOB): NOK 48,200.,000 
   
Kvinesdal (Lack of information, cannot justify the number below, but according 
to Hofstad 2008): 
2003 Interest swap with DNB NOR:  NOK 43,600,000 
2003 Purchase of CLN Cloverie: NOK 33,000,000 
2003 Purchase of saving product Helgeland S.bank: NOK 10,000,000 
2005 Purchase of CDO NOK 33,000,000 
2007 Purchase of CDO Banque AIG (TOB): NOK 43,600,000 
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Introduction to the research topic 
 
This thesis will investigate the financial scandal that took place in Norway in 
2007. During late 2007 it became known that several municipalities in Norway 
with the help of Terra Securities were leveraging and gambling future incomes in 
complicated high risk funds in the U.S. through Citigroup. They were advised by 
Terra to leverage their investments with security in future incomes in order to 
obtain higher profits (Hofstad 2008). This scandal later became known as “The 
Terra-scandal”. 
 
The story was first revealed by Morten Hofstad, who at that time was a journalist 
employed by Finansavisen ASA. In 2008 he released the book “Eventyret om 
TERRA og de åtte små kommunene som dro til Wall Street for å bli rike” on the 
subject, and through his research won the “Skup-prize”.  
 
The records show that eight so-called energy producing municipalities 
(Kraftkommuner) had heavily invested in products of Terra Securities and were 
affected by the scandal. These municipalities were Bremanger, Haugesund, 
Hattfjelldal, Hemnes, Kvinesdal, Narvik, Rana and Vik. Later research in 2010 
(Forland, Pettersen and Røiseland 2011) showed that also Akershus 
Fylkeskommunale Pensjonskasse and the private investment company Langen 
Invest were among those affected.  
 
There was a lack of knowledge and cooperation between CitiBank, Terra and the 
municipalities. Information from Terra about the different risks and products was 
not unveiled, and communication problems within the municipalities’ own 
financial advisers and the mayor lead to purchase of complicated products such as 
Credit Linked Notes (CLN) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO). These 
were products the municipalities had very little to almost none knowledge about. 
Sold by CitiBank, these derivatives were backed by sub-prime mortgage loans. As 
soon as the financial crisis hit the U.S., these products decreased heavily in value. 
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Research problem reviewed 
 
Ever since the story first became public in 2007, there has, to our knowledge, 
been no scientific research about it. The reason why these municipalities did agree 
to buy such products, and what kind of products they were offered is still a 
mystery to many. Our aim with this Master thesis is to unveil more information 
about this scandal, and to be the first research paper about this specific topic in 
Norway. There are currently ongoing lawsuits where the municipalities have 
taken legal actions against Citigroup, who they believe were issuing illegal loans 
in contradiction to the Municipality Act. For this reason information is difficult to 
obtain due to confidentiality clauses.  
 
Our research question is as following: 
 
“What can explain eight Norwegian municipalities’ gamble on risky financial 
products during 2001 – 2007?” 
 
This thesis will be divided into three parts. In part one, we will provide the reader 
with the background information and explain what the products were. 
Kredittilsynet published an article about how they rarely have investigated such 
complex products (Haugen 2007). Understanding these products will be a key part 
of our research in order to be able to answer the research question. There has been 
some research about CDO’s in general, but not into the specific CDO’s that were 
purchased by the municipalities. As a start, we will get hold of the official 
presentation documents from Citibank and Kredittilsynet’s final report. 
 
The risk profile of the municipalities with and without the products will be 
discussed in part two. We will check if entering into these products changes the 
risk profile to a more risky, less risky or to an unaffected one. 
 
In the third part we will apply a statistical approach to test if there were any 
common denominators for the municipalities who invested in these products, 
contra those who did not. We will try to explain common denominators, if found, 
with theory from behavioral finance.  
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1. Background information 
 
Reports from KPMG (Noreng 2008), PWC (Kvamme 2008) and SF Revisjon 
(Sogn og Fjordane revisjon 2008) on the different municipalities give a basic 
understanding of how the investments were marketed to the municipalities. The 
first investment happened on June 6th, 2001 by Vik Kommune.  
 
The main goal of a municipality is to redistribute resources from the community 
to provide a steady stream of services to the community. The municipality of Vik, 
as the other seven, is an energy-producing municipality and has three main 
income sources from its production: 
 
1. Energy fee (Konsesjonsavgift). This is the annual fee each municipality 
receives from the energy plant as compensation for the utilizing of its natural 
resources.  
 
2. Property taxes (Eiendomsskatt). Energy producers are important sources for 
property taxes. This income is considered as yearly fixed income.  
 
3. Energy power (Konsesjonskraft). This is energy the producer must make 
available for the municipality for their disposal. The amount will be determined 
based on the production volume. The energy is bought at production cost, which 
is more or less fixed at 0,09 kr/kWh (Sogn og Fjordane revisjon 2008). 
 
After the millennium the municipalities experienced a couple of years with 
uncertain income streams from the power production because of a very volatile 
power market. A variable income stream is not a good foundation to be able to 
provide a steady stream of services. For this reason, the mayor of Vik Kommune 
at that time came up with an idea: Why not get a fixed price deal? The fixed price 
would generate certain income, which could be invested into interest carrying 
accounts or in the financial markets. He consulted the municipality’s own bank, 
Vik Sparebank, to help him with the problem. They referred him to their financial 
partner, Terra Securities, who came up with a solution to the mayor’s problem. 
Master Thesis GRA19003  02.09.2013 
Page 66 
However, Terra Securities purposed an additional idea, a reversed zero coupon 
swap (ZCS): what if the municipality also borrowed money calculated against the 
net present value of future income and invested this amount in the financial 
markets for a higher return than the price of borrowing? This would according to 
Terra Securities yield Vik Kommune with an arbitrage opportunity.  
 
The Municipality Law §50 (Kommuneloven, §50. Låneopptak) defines what 
products each municipality legally is allowed to invest in, and how this can be 
financed. According to this section, municipalities can borrow money to invest in 
property, plant and equipment. The idea is that the future income from the 
investment should be able to cover the interest payments and the installments. 
Borrowing to be able to invest in risky investments is not allowed since the 
expected return is combined with risk, which can reduce the ability to provide 
basic services. 
 
A letter from the Ministry of Local Government and Regional development (KRD 
2013) on the September 20th, 2002, concerning the legality of their proposed 
investment plan, concluded that Vik’s plan to trade 10 years of future energy 
power revenue with a one time payment from DnB was not to be considered as a 
loan, and therefor the investment would not fall under §50. This means that Vik 
got the green light to reconstruct their energy power. However, the department 
based its conclusion on that there was no change in the risk profile and that the 
municipality would have to familiarize themselves with the increase in their risk 
exposure.  
 
This so-called “Vik-letter” later became the loophole each of the Terra-
municipalities used to justify their investments. Vik and Terra entered into an 
agreement to restructure the owner rights of the future energy power with the goal 
to increase the future profits. Terra became the financial advisor for Vik’s 
investments, as well for the other seven municipalities later. All information and 
materials from Terra to Vik was never published due to their confidentiality 
agreement and this laid the foundation for all future affiliations between Terra and 
Vik.  
 
Even though there may be different circumstances, the assumptions and incentives 
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behind each investment and the main idea behind the products were the same for 
all municipalities. They all wanted to increase their returns from the energy 
power.  
 
1.1 The Products 
 
We first give an explanation of how the products in general work. After this we 
connect the products to the specific case of the municipalities and how their 
investments happened.  
 
1.1.1. Zero Coupon Swap (ZCS) 
 
The concept behind the zero-coupon swap is making it possible for an investor to 
sell the net present value of future income for a onetime payment.  
 
1.1.2. Credit Default Swap (CDS) 
 
This is a contract between two partners where the buyer of the contract pays the 
seller a fixed yearly premium in return for receiving a conditional payment in the 
case of a specific credit event, such as default or a loss of a before agreed upon 
amount or percentage of a financial instrument. The principle is the same as 
buying insurance from an insurance company for your financial instrument. 
 
1.1.3. Total Return Swap (TRS) 
 
A TRS is a swap agreement where the two parties agree to swap the total returns 
of an asset for a periodic payment (Gilleshammer et al. 2008). Why and how this 
works is as follows: There are times when investors cannot, for legal or practical 
reasons, invest in a product by selling an underlying asset. To be able to be 
exposed to the wished product, the investor can then agree to a TRS with a bank. 
Banks are often the second party in a TRS because the market for the underlying 
assets often is illiquid or non-existing. The bank, on behalf of the investor, will 
then invest the agreed amount in the product. To be able to invest, the bank 
borrows the value of the underlying asset in the money market with security in the 
underlying asset, plus an additional amount in either cash or liquid assets. For this 
Master Thesis GRA19003  02.09.2013 
Page 68 
the investor pays the banks borrowing costs plus an additional fee, which is the 
banks periodic payment (f.ex. LIBOR+0.7%). In return, the total return of the 
investment will be paid to the investor. In case of negative return, the investor has 
to compensate the bank for the loss.  
 
1.1.4. Credit Linked Note (CLN) 
 
CLN can be seen upon as an obligation build on highly rated (AAA) CDS’. By 
issuing a CLN, the issuer will be able to transfer the default risk over to the credit 
investors. The CLN is issued through a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or trust. 
When investors buy securities from this trust, they received either a fixed or 
floating rate which is the premium paid by the CDS owners. At the end of the 
contract, the investors of the CLN will receive a par value depending on the status 
of the collateralized securities. In the case of no credit event, the investors will be 
returned their initial investment at par. In cases where CDS’ have defaulted, 
investors will at minimum receive an amount equal to the recovery rate (less than 
par) (Andresen & Gjerdrup 2004). 
 
1.1.5. Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) 
 
Collateralized debt obligations are securities where you acquire an asset and 
return from a portfolio of debt securities. The owner of a CDO will therefore take 
on the risk for the underlying debt securities. The facilitator (the bank) that owns a 
portfolio of debt securities sells their portfolio to an SPV, which has a main 
purpose to reduce the risk for their clients. By doing this, the facilitator gets 
liquidity back in the balance. To be able to finance the purchase of the debt 
portfolio, the SPV issues a CDO at the value of the portfolio and sells the debt 
securities to CDO investors. The CDO is built up by different types of credit 
ratings, known as tranches. Tranches are different levels of security, where Senior 
has highest priority, Mezzanine second and Equity the lowest (Rakkestad and 
Weme 2006). The cash flow from the underlying asset is then directed to the 
investor by the SPV, less the commissions and transaction fees. The cash flow is 
then paid out after priority to the different tranches.  
Master Thesis GRA19003  02.09.2013 
Page 69 
1.1.6. Synthetic CDO 
 
A synthetic CDO is a more complex type of CDO. The main difference between 
these two is that the SPV does not have the juridical responsibility for the 
underlying. It works the following way: 
 
A facilitator has a portfolio of securities and wants to reduce the risk. Instead of 
selling the portfolio right away (eliminating the risk), the facilitator wants to 
insure it against loss. To be able to do so, he creates an SPV which issues a CDS. 
This CDS will then be bought by the facilitator and acts as insurance in case the 
portfolio falls too much in value. The insurance will be paid if a predetermined 
loss level is reached. To be compensated for offering this insurance, the SPV 
expects a to be premium paid. However, the SPV will in most cases not have 
enough liquidity to cover a payout of a credit event. To be able to pay for this, the 
SPV issues CDO’s and sells them to investors. The value of the CDO’s issued 
will approximately equal the value of the CDS. The money from the investors 
buying the CDO’s is then used to invest in a safety portfolio, which is a low risk 
portfolio consisting government bonds etc. These risk free investments are meant 
to reduce the risk of the CDO investors since their returns will the first to be 
affected in case of a credit event. The idea can be compared to an insurance 
company that pays out insurance for a stolen cell phone versus having to pay out 
the total amount for a house that burned to the ground (defaulting). Reports of 
stolen cell phones occur much more often (and are cheaper to cover) than the ones 
of houses caught on fire.  
 
In the case of no credit event, the cash flow to the CDO investor will consist of 
the periodical premium payments in addition to a smaller part of the return in the 
safety portfolio. In the case of a credit event, the investor will at max lose the 
value that the CDS is worth, but will keep the return from the security investment.  
 
1.1.7. Tender Option Bonds (TOB) fund 
 
Municipals (tender option bonds) are obligations with a coupon and a par value. 
The difference between these and regular bonds is that there is no marketplace for 
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purchasing the municipals. Literature and research have shown (Fabozzi 2005) 
that the actual return is higher than the theoretical return, yielding an arbitrage 
opportunity. According to Green (1993), this arbitrage opportunity comes from a 
tax benefit municipals have compared to regular obligation. This arbitrage is what 
the TOB fund seeks through having a long position in municipals. 
 
A TOB fund’s intuition is to invest in municipals, and in addition hedge part of 
the portfolio with a swap that gives us a floating rate instead of a fixed. The rate 
from the municipals due to the tax benefit will be larger than the rate we have to 
pay for the swap. The floating rate we get from the swap is the LIBOR less taxes. 
This money will be invested in the money market, which again will give us a 
return of tax corrected LIBOR. The cash flow from the money market will 
therefore equal the cash flows from the swap and the arbitrage will come from the 
interest rate after tax in municipalities less the interest rate (fixed) paid on the 
swap. 
 
1.2. Investment stages 
 
There are 4-6 stages of investments (depending on if they reconstruct the property 
tax and energy fee), which the Terra municipalities have in common. Some 
municipalities reconstructed only energy power while others reconstructed their 
energy power, energy fee and property taxes. We can in general divide the 
investments into these following stages (KMPG Narvik Report 2008): 
 
1.2.1. Reconstruction of energy power to fund investment or CLN 
 
The general process for the Terra municipalities’ reconstruction of the energy 
power is as following (Hofstad 2008): The municipality contacts an energy-
company (for example Hafslund) to sell their energy power at a yearly fixed fee of 
10 kr for 10 years. The total money received will be 100 kr over the 10 year 
period. Knowing this, the municipalities contact their bank to borrow an amount 
that yields a yearly repayment of interest and principal of 10 kr. We assume this 
gives them a loan of 95 kr. The 95 kr will then be invested in obligations and 
securities, where the expected yearly return is higher, for example 11 kr, than the 
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cost of borrowing. This means that by the end of their investment they will 
receive a total of 110 kr, rather than 100 they would have received from the sale to 
Hafslund.  
 
The main problem with this investment model is that it takes place in a static 
world. All variables such as the risks and investment value are fixed. As soon as 
the energy prices, interests or risk changes, the investment will no longer be 
profitable as previously predicted. 
 
1.2.2. Reconstruction of energy fee to fund investments 
 
This process will be the same as the reconstruction of the energy power. 
Municipalities contact a bank for a loan with the interest and principal payments 
each year equivalent to the energy fee received each year. The loan will be 
invested in obligations and securities such as in banks and other foreign bonds. 
 
1.2.3. Reconstruction of property taxes to fund investments 
 
Of the eight municipalities, Narvik and Bremanger reconstructed their property 
taxes. Narvik kommune decided in 2005 to make a zero coupon swap with DnB. 
This means that they will receive a onetime payment from DnB today for their 
future property tax income. The net present value of future tax income was 
calculated to be 190 mill kr. This amount was then invested in CLN obligations 
(While Bremanger invested in funds such as those mentioned above). 
 
1.2.4. Fund investment to CLN 
 
Municipalities sell their low risk investments in funds, in order to invest in CLN. 
 
1.2.5. Reconstruction of CLN to CDO 
 
In 2006, Terra called the municipalities’ financial advisers informing them about a 
credit event that had occurred. The main reason was that the securities bought 
through CLN have had their credit-rating changed. No further information was 
given about why the credit event had occurred. According to Terra, reinvesting in 
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CDO would make it possible to reduce the amount of “badly rated securities”, 
while the risk of CDO is as low as, or even lower, than the CLN’s (Noreng 2008). 
Reports later revealed that the reconstruction in CDO was done without a credit-
rating of the new investment products. 
 
1.2.6. Reconstruction of CDO to CDO with linked to tender options fund 
(Municipal fund) 
 
In 2007 the municipalities again were contacted by Terra. This time the 
municipalities were informed that Terra found new obligations that could increase 
their profit even more. They were recommended to sell their current CDO and 
purchase a customized CDO with the return linked to a municipality fund, in this 
case an American fund. The reports done by PWC, KPMG and SF Revisjon later 
showed that Terra withheld critical information. In Rana Kommune, 3 important 
pages about the “key risks” of Citybanks CDO-investment were left out when 
Terra translated them from English to Norwegian. Terra themselves also revealed 
to Kredittilsynet that the document “Funds Linked Repackaged Note” was 
attached after Hemnes Kommune decided to reconstruct their CLN. A “Funds 
Linked Repackaged Note”” is a document with information about the Citibank 
rights to terminate the contract in case of reduction in the investment 
(Fylkesmannen report Hemnes 2008).  
 
1.3. Literature review 
 
Mortgage based securities have played and will continue to play an important role 
in the capital market. This is due to the many risk benefits such as the opportunity 
for hedge fund managers to make strategic allocations in order to diversify their 
investments. All risk that investors must take into account stems from the various 
functions financial markets have in the global economy (Jaeger, 2008: 138). 
These economic functions give banks and insurance companies the opportunity to 
move the undesired risk to other partners and companies. 
 
We understand that the misuse of mortgage backed securities such as CDO’s and 
CLN was the main reason for the financial crisis of 2008 (Jo, Hoje et al 2008:10). 
At the beginning, these securities were meant to help investors to hedge corporate 
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bonds, especially because these swaps do not require the speculators to actually 
own the bonds (Adam and Guettler 2011: 2). As soon as people saw the advantage 
of the swaps, the market soon became flooded with these investments (Morgensen 
2008). These kinds of derivatives are the same as the products the municipalities 
in Norway purchased during the 2001-2007 period.  
 
The growing amount of new derivative products, coupled with the lack of 
customer service and support from the financial institutions, has left 
municipalities and small firms in a difficult position (Hance 2008). The biggest 
reasons for failure in the financial market was because of the lack of knowledge 
(Carlin 2008: 278–287) of the derivatives and to fully comprehend the legal risks 
associated with the instruments. 
 
The lack of information leads to an increase in demand for independent and 
external expert help such as financial advisers. Studies have shown that people 
tend to think these advisers fail to de-bias their clients and often reinforce biases 
that are in their interests (Mullainathan, Noeth and Schoar 2012: 18). In reality, 
they are returns-chasing and encourage investors to invest in funds with high 
transaction fees. Many of the institutions that provided these products were not 
insured by the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) and were later 
labeled as shadow banks (Krugman 2009). Because of such banks the market was 
flooded with Mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations and 
credit default swaps; and as soon as the market collapsed, a global financial crisis 
was unveiled.  
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2. Risk Profile 
 
To show the risk profile of the municipalities’ portfolio, we will use Vik 
Kommune’s investments as an example.  
 
The data for the risk profile will be of type daily time series. Data from the energy 
market are gathered from the Nordpool-Electricity Average Reference index in 
the time period 06.06.2001 to 01.12.2007 and will represent the volatility in the 
income stream for the municipalities, if they had not invested in any products. The 
investment period is divided into three parts.  
 
As part one Vik invested into low risk funds (2001). In the second stage (part) the 
municipality invested in CLN products (2005). After 2006, the investment 
structure changed to link CDO’s up to a TOB fund, which will be our third part. 
Therefore, we will need daily time series data on both the CLN investments and 
the later TOB exposure. The data will be collected through Thomson Reuters’ 
Datastream, the financial information provider Markit and financial institutions. 
 
One question is whether or not the entering in each of the investments actually 
would change the risk profile of the municipalities. From reports we know that 
Vik went from a volatile income stream to a static one where they were offered to 
sell the energy for 19-20 øre/kWh by Statkraft (Hofstad 2008), giving a 
guaranteed profit of more than 100% of the purchasing cost. Moving from a safe 
income stream to a uncertain one, will always be connected some amount of risk. 
The question is how the risk profile changed when comparing the volatility of the 
financial products to the volatility of the energy price movements. We believe that 
the risk increased. 
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3. Research 
3.1. Data 
 
The data will be collected from the municipalities who were offered and invested 
in products. We will be gathering information from all energy producing 
municipalities in Norway to check if they were contacted and offered products by 
Terra Securities. There are in total 160 energy-producing municipalities.  
 
The primary data set used in the analysis will be gathered directly from the 
municipalities by first hand research. Since there is no database containing the 
information we need, it will all be gathered by surveys, interviews and research in 
public databases. Public databases used, in addition to the public databases 
registered and maintained by each of the municipalities them selves, will be the 
ones from Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) and Ministry Of Local 
Government And Regional Development (KRD). We will identify and locate the 
employees and people responsible for the decisions during that time, in addition to 
those in the same positions today. 
 
The data set will be comprised of the variables likelihood to invest, gender, age, 
education, financial related education, political party, size of decision board, 
tenure, majority of votes, location, time to re-election, marital status, children, 
financial literacy and experience in financial markets.  
 
The information about the variables will be collected by a questionnaire sent out 
to the municipalities, first directed to the people who were involved in the 
processes during the time of the offers. Next, we will ask the people responsible 
for those kinds of decisions today in the municipalities to answer the 
questionnaire as well to find out if the over-all values of the variables have 
changed since the publicity of the scandal, especially with respect to financial 
literacy and financial work experience. We assume that the people in the 
municipalities who accepted the offers, now, years after the scandal, would be 
biased towards what we define as variables for general financial literacy and 
financial experience. This may be because those involved have been through 
public outings, investigations related to the case and are still involved in 
litigation's.  
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The questionnaire will be consisting of two parts. The first part will be structured 
as a basic survey for cross-sectional data. The cross-sectional data will be 
classified by discrete data with cardinal integers. The second part will contain a 
survey to measure financial literacy. We define financial literacy as the ability to 
understand financial theory and thinking. To be able to determine the level of 
financial literacy, we will create financial questions ranging from basic day-to-day 
knowledge to over-the-average knowledge about financial markets and simple 
financial products. The questions will include issues such as calculating basic 
interests, discounts, banking issues, diversification, liquidity, risk, investments in 
stocks, funds etc. 
 
3.2. Hypothesis 
 
The first hypothesis will build on the how the collected variables are influencing 
the decision to invest, contra not to invest. The question that remains is whether or 
not the eight municipalities who invested in the products had some kind of 
common denominator.  
 
Hypothesis 1: There are common denominators between the eight investing 
municipalities contra those who did not invest. 
 
We have reasons to believe that an offer to increase the income of the 
municipalities is a strong incentive to invest in the products. But the question of 
why some would invest in such complicated products with so little knowledge 
about them while others turned them down, still remains unsolved.  
 
The second of our hypothesis’ will be testing if whether or not the people who 
took part of the decision making in the municipalities who accepted the offers are 
biased towards financial literacy and financial experience. We believe that their 
participation and involvement in public outings, investigations and interviews by 
internal and external control organs, in addition to litigations, which today still are 
unsolved, will make them biased towards what we think the general knowledge 
base is. If this is true, then our research towards their knowledge at that time will 
not be correctly represented when questioned today. This is because we believe 
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that people tend to try to learn from previous mistakes. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a bias of the level of knowledge between the 
representatives during the scandal and the average in said municipality today.  
 
If H2 holds, then we will have to try to correct for this bias in our main research 
question. If we assume that those who today occupy the positions do not have the 
same bias, one solution may be to use today’s knowledge level as a benchmark for 
the financial literacy and financial experience instead of the data gathered from 
the accepting municipalities. We think that this will represent a more correct 
distribution of the knowledge at that time. Further, a little remark can be that 
because of the latest financial crisis, we could assume that people today will be 
more aware of financial products and finance in general than they were in the 
early 2000s.  
 
3.2.1. The variables explained 
 
- Likelihood to invest 
Based on the how many out of the 160 energy-producing municipalities 
where offered these products, this variable will state how high the 
investing percentage was. (8/160). 
- Gender 
This variable will be of type dummy, coded as 0 for men and 1 for women. 
Research has shown that women are more risk averse than men (Eckel 
2008: 1071) and we assume that the higher percentage of women on the 
decision board, the less likely it is that they would have invested. This 
variable should in our opinion have a negative effect on the likelihood to 
invest.  
- Age 
Age will be a categorically variable with age intervals. We believe that the 
higher the average age is, the more experience they have and thus the more 
risk averse they will be to gamble on new products. Thus, the higher the 
age, the more negative effect it should have on the likelihood to invest. 
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- Education 
The education variable will be of the same type as age. We assume that the 
higher the average education, the less likely they are to invest in the 
products offered. We again believe that the higher education, the more 
negative effect the variable will have. The assumption is that higher 
educated people are better trained within the understanding of probabilities 
and statistics. 
- Financial related education 
This will be a dummy variable, where 0 implies non-financial education 
whilst 1 implies a higher education (3-years or more) within the direction 
of finance. The assumption is the same as for the variable “education”, 
however, we believe that this one will have a stronger negative influence 
than “education”.  
- Political party 
Will be a categorical variable. We have no beliefs about what political 
party the majority of the decision board belongs to will have any impact. 
However, we add it to make sure there is no correlation. 
- Size of decision board 
The report by SF Revisjon about Vik Kommune quoted “we never 
discussed the need for competence within the financial department, and 
there has never been any systematic rules for such either. [...] there was no 
one who raised their hand and said that this case had been to difficult for 
them. At the same time, neither did I.” We assume that the larger the size 
of the decision board was, the more likely the individuals are to victims of 
peer-pressure and thus not state their insecurity (Milgram 1965:134).  
- Tenure 
Tenure measures how many terms the mayor has had. We believe that the 
more terms the mayor has been in office, the less pressure he/she will have 
to prove themselves, and thus be less willing to invest. 
- Majority of votes 
This is supposed to measure the percentage of support/votes the mayor 
has. The intuition is that the closer to losing the majority, the more likely 
the mayor would be to invest in order to be able to prove his/hers 
worthiness. 
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- Location 
Location will be a categorical variable. The reasoning behind this variable 
is that we do not want to miss out on any possibly cultural effect. Could 
there be any cultural reasons for being more risk prone than other places?  
- Time to re-election 
The assumption is that the shorter time to re-election, the more incentive 
the board would have to invest to be able to show off their ability to 
generate income to the public, thus buying voters. We believe that it will 
positively influence the probability to invest the less time there is to next 
election.  
- Marital status 
This variable is supposed to cover the participant’s private status.  
- Children 
We believe that people who have children tend to be more risk averse than 
others. Could this variable explain any differences between the 
municipalities? We assume that it will negatively influence the probability 
of investing. 
- Financial literacy 
This variable is supposed to measure the level of financial literacy of the 
participants. We assume that the higher value this variable has, the lower 
the probability of entering into the products. It should therefore be a 
negative relationship between financial literacy and likelihood to invest.  
- Financial experience  
We define financial experience as having practiced within the area for at 
least three years. We assume that the longer experience the average has, 
the less likely they are to invest in the products. Again, we assume a 
negative relationship. 
 
Overall, we believe that the combination of the variables financial literacy, 
financial experience and financial related education will have the most weight 
with regard to not investing in these products.  
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3.3. Methodology 
 
Our approach will start with a basic linear equation on the form  
, 
where  is the percentage of municipalities who invested in the products, given 
those who were presented with an offer;  is the percentage of a unit change in  
explained by the explanatory variables , ,..., .  
 
Since the independent variables will be a combination of categorical and 
continuous variables the multivariate normality assumptions will not hold. This is 
because normal linear regression will have problems with variables that have 
values that are greater than 1 and smaller than 0. Falsely using classic OLS will 
thus give us estimates above 100%. The use of a logistic function will avoid this 
since it does not make any assumptions about the distribution of the independent 
variables (Brooks 2008).  
 
The basic logistic regression equation is given by 
, 
where  is defined as the odds of the function. The relationship between odds 
and probability is given by 
. 
The relationship is here represented as a logistic curve that asymptotically 
approaches infinity as the independent variables , ,...,  approach 1.  
 
As the final approach, we will use the maximum likelihood estimator together 
with a stepwise selection procedure.  
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4. Progression plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 1: 
- Contact municipalities about their connection with 
Terra communities: 15
th
 Jan. 2009. 
o 60 answers out of 160 municipalities. 
o 27 confirmed contact with Terra. 
o 8 confirmed invested in the product. 
- Contact PWC, KPMG, SF revisjon and 
“Fylkesmann” for additional information about 
each investment stages. 
- Get hold of actual contract between each 
municipalities and Terra Securities. 
- Gather data of indexes for risk portfolio analysis: 
o Contact CitiBank for CDO index. 
o Contact markit.com for itraxx index. 
Stage 4: 
- Analyze and discuss results. 
 
Stage 2: 
- Gather information about each municipalities that 
have been contacted by Terra: Find information 
about each variables through: 
o Statistics Norway (SSB). 
o Norwegian Social Science Data Services 
(NSD). 
o Contact answered municipalities for 
further information. 
- Full analysis of the products purchased. 
o Theoretical basis and how they in theory 
are supposed to produce surplus. 
o Linking the products parts with the 
municipalities investments (Especially the 
TOB fund) 
- Create survey’s and questions for financial 
literacy testing test 
Stage 3: 
- Work on gathered data . 
- Prepare the regressions. 
- Final contact with municipalities and accounting 
firms for needed information. 
- Run the regression. 
- Analyze risk portfolio. 
Master Thesis GRA19003  02.09.2013 
Page 82 
 
References 
 
Adam, Tim and Andre Guettler. 2011. "The use of credit default swaps by U.S. 
Fixed-Income Mutual Funds". Humboldt University, Institute of Corporate 
Finance, Dorotheenstr. See PDF on CD 
 
Albrethson, Ingfrid. Fylkesmannen i Nordland. 2008. "Lovlighetskontroll av 
finansreglement og finansplasseringer - Hattfjelldal kommune".  
See PDF on CD 
 
Andersen, Tor Øyvind. 2009. “Terra Securities konkurs”. E24 Homepage 
http://e24.no/makro-og-politikk/terra-securities-konkurs/2124446.  
Accessed April 5th 2013 
 
Blanco, Carlos, Sue Choi and David Soronow. 2001. “Energy price processes 
used for derivative pricing & risk management” FEA - Financial Engineering 
Associates 
- http://www.fea.com/resources/a_energy_price_processes.pdf 
- http://www.fea.com/resources/a_mean_reverting_processes.pdf 
- http://www.fea.com/resources/a_jump_diffusion_processes.pdf 
Accessed June 19th 2013 
 
Bourbannais, Regis and Sophie Meritet. 2006. “Electricity spot prices modeling: 
Univariate time series apporach” The Econometrics of Energy Systems Chapter 3. 
See PDF on CD 
 
Brooks, Chris. 2008. “Introductory Econometrics for Finance”. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p.317 
 
Byström, Hans. 2005. “Extreme Value Theory and extremely large electricity 
price changes” International Review of Economics and Finance Vol. 14(1) pages: 
41-55.  
See PDF on CD 
 
Master Thesis GRA19003  02.09.2013 
Page 83 
Carlin, Bruce I. 2008. "Strategic price complexity in retail financial markets" 
Journal of Financial Economics 91 pages: 278-287 
http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/kraehmer/Lehre/Beh_IO/Carlin%20-
%20Strategic%20price%20complexity%20in%20retail%20financial%20markets.
pdf.  
Accessed July 30th 2013 
 
Cartea, Alvaro & Figueroa, Marcello. 2005. “Pricing electricity Markets: a mean 
reverting jump diffision model with seasonality” Birkbeck College, University of 
London.  
See PDF on CD 
 
Citigroup. 2013. “Prospect sent to municipalities”  
See PDF on CD 
 
Cloverie. 2005. “Series Prospects”. Prospect Cloverie NO: 2005-61 
See PDF on CD 
 
Dodd-Frank. 2013. “Asset-Backed Securities”. Dodd-Frank homepage 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/assetbackedsecurities.shtml  
Accessed Mars 25th 2013 
 
Farbrot, Audun. 2007. “Oppskriften på en finanskrise” 
http://www.forskning.no/artikler/2007/mai/1178188672.28.  
Accessed July 25th 2013 
 
Forland, Pettersen and Røiseland. NRK.no. 2011. "Fylkeskommune tapte 43 
millioner på Terra". http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/distrikt/nordland/1.7827592. 
Accessed January 6th 2013 
 
Gilleshammer, Per Kristian, Lars Erik Indermo, Richard Jensen and Gunnar 
Sølberg. 2008. "Hvilke investeringer gjorde nordlandskommunene i sommeren 
2007, og hvordan fungerte disse strukturerte produktene?". Høgskolen i Sør-
Trøndelag. 
 
Master Thesis GRA19003  02.09.2013 
Page 84 
Guthrie, Graham and Steen Videbeck. 2007. “Electricity spot price dynamics: 
Beyond financial models” Energy Policy Vol 35(1) pages: 5614-5621. 
 
Hance, Jonathon Keath. 2008. "Derivatives at Bankruptcy: Lifesaving Knowledge 
for the Small firm". 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. pages: 711-766  
See PDF on CD 
 
Huisman, Ronald and Ronald Mahieu. 2003. “Regime jumps in electricity prices” 
Energy Economics Vol. 26 pages: 425-434.  
See PDF on CD 
 
Khotari, Vinod (2006). “The Financial Instrument of the Future”. Wiley Finance. 
p. 414 
http://books.google.no/books?id=Vy00CVy5SS8C&pg=PA436&lpg=PA436&dq
=spread+cdo+liability&source=bl&ots=69GflAvmKB&sig=XPdOza9yMOXTf5o
HrMIrtUS-7HY&hl=no&sa=X&ei=EStsUde-
DYf44QSnuoGwAw&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=500&f=false  
 
Haugen, Stein Ove. Hegnar.no. 2007. "Kredittilsynet: - Svært kompliserte 
produkter". http://www.hegnar.no/article237894.ece.  
Accessed January 6th 2013 
 
Haugesund 2013. “Documents regarding Haugesund and their investments” 
See PDF on CD 
 
Haraldsen, Christian H..2007. “Starter på nytt - 15 år etter skandalen” E24 
http://e24.no/makro-og-politikk/starter-paa-nytt-15-aar-etter-
skandalen/1783567?recommend=true  
Accessed May 6th 2013 
 
Hofstad, Morten. 2008. "Eventyret om Terra og de åtte kommunesom dro til Wall 
Street for å bli rike". Oslo: AIT Trykk Otta AS. 
 
Hull, John C. 2003. “Options, Futures and Other Derivatives”. Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice Hall. p. 287 and p. 684 
Master Thesis GRA19003  02.09.2013 
Page 85 
 
Jaeger, Lars. 2008."Hedge fund Replication and Alternative Beta Strategies". 
West Sussex: Wiley and Sons, Inc.  
See PDF on CD 
 
Jo, Hoje, Claudia Lee, Adam Munguia and Cantalina Nguyen. 2008 "Unethical 
misuse of derivatives and market volatility around the global financial crisis". 
Journal of Academic and Business Ethincs. Volume 2: July, 2009.  
See PDF on CD 
 
KRD: Kommune- og regionalsdepartementet. 2013. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/krd.html?id=504.  
Accessed January 9th 2013 
 
Krugman, Paul. 2009. "The return of depression economics and the crisis of 
2008". New York: W.W Norton and Company, Inc. 
 
Kvamme, Helge and Mads Blomfelt. Pricewaterhouse Coopers AS rapport. 2008. 
"Granskningrapport Terra-saken i Rana Kommune".  
See PDF on CD 
 
Libretto 1. 2006. “Series Prospects”. Libretto Series No: 2006-003  
See PDF on CD 
 
Libretto 2. 2006. “Series Prospects”. Libretto Series No: 2006-004  
See PDF on CD 
 
Linsmeier, Thomas J. and Neil D. Pearson. 1999. “Risk Measurement: An 
Introduction to Value at Risk”. University of Illinois at Urbana-Chamaign. 
http://www.casact.net/education/specsem/99frmgt/pearson2.pdf 
Accessed April 14th 2013 
 
Lovdata. 2013. "Forskrift om justering av konsesjonsavgifter, årlige erstatninger 
og fond m.v. i medhold av vassdragslovgivningen §5"  
http://www.lovdata.no/for/sf/oe/xe-19871204-0945.html#1 
Master Thesis GRA19003  02.09.2013 
Page 86 
Accessed May 25th 2013 
  
Lov om kommuner og fylkeskommuner (Kommuneloven) 2012. 
http://www.lovdata.no/all/nl-19920925-107.html.  
Accessed January 9th 2013. 
 
Lucas, Douglas J., Laurie S. Goodman and Frank J. Fabozzi. 2006. 
“Collateralized Debt Obligations and Credit Risk Transfer” Yale ICF Working 
Paper No. 0706. p. 4 
http://usdrinc.com/downloads/Collateralized-Debt-Obligations.pdf 
 
Lund og Co. 2013. “Concession power (compulsory power)” Lund and og Co 
homepage http://www.lundogco.no/no/LVK/English/Concessionary-
legislation/Concession-power-compulsory-power/  
Accessed Mars 2th 2013 
 
Meyer, Henrik D. 2003. “Halden: Økokrim snart klar”. Dagens Næringsliv 
homepage 
http://www.dn.no/arkiv/article35656.ece 
Accessed April 27th 2013 
 
Morgensen, Gretchen. New York Times 2008.."Naked came the speculators". 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/business/10gret.html?dbk&_r=0 
Accessed June 26th 2013 
 
Myrvang, Günter Fylkesmannen i Nordland. 2008. "Lovlighetskontroll av 
finansreglement og finansplasseringer - Rana kommune".  
Accessed January 6th 2013 
 
Norges Bank. 2004.”Norske finansmarkeder – pengepolitikk og finansiell 
stabilitet 
” Norges Banks skriftserie nr. 34. Chapter 7: Prisstabilitet. p. 104 
http://www.norges-
bank.no/Upload/import/publikasjoner/skriftserie/34/kapittel7.pdf  
Accessesd June 25th 2013 
Master Thesis GRA19003  02.09.2013 
Page 87 
 
Noreng, Stein-Ragnar. KPMG rapport. 2008. "Vurdering av Narvik kommunes 
beslutnings prosesser, vedtak og oppfølging i "Terrasaken" .  
See PDF on CD. 
 
NVE – Norges Vassdrags- og energidirektorat. 2013. “Nettleie” 
http://www.nve.no/no/kraftmarked/forbrukersider/nettleie1  
Accessed June 31th 2013 
 
Peterson, Steven P. 2012 "Investment theory and risk management". New Jersey: 
Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
 
Plaintiff Court London. 2009. “Haugesund Kommune and Narvik Kommune vs. 
Depfa ACS Bank” Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL. Case 
NO: 2008 Folio 1320. p. 4 
See PDF on CD 
 
Plaintiff Court New York. 2009. “Terra Securities ASA konkursbo vs. Citigroup” 
United States District Court for  The Southern District of New York. p.10  
See PDF on CD 
 
Rakkestad, Ketil Johan and Sindre Weme. 2006. “CDO-er: Nye muligheter for å 
investere i kredittmarkedet”. 
http://www.norges-
bank.no/Upload/import/publikasjoner/penger_og_kreditt/2006-02/rakkestad.pdf 
Accessed January 9th 2013 
 
NTB. 2008. “Vil styrke kompetansen etter  Terra-skandalen”. Kommunal rapport 
http://kommunal-
rapport.no/artikkel/vil_styrke_kompetansen_etter_terraskandalen 
Accessed July 29th 2013 
 
Rigibon, Roberto. 2009. “Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus - 
Introductory Notes”. Massachusettes Institute Of Technology Lecture Notes 
Master Thesis GRA19003  02.09.2013 
Page 88 
http://www.learningace.com/doc/179058/409e16a92e688f97a3d82a134cc2c216/b
m 
Accessed June 10th 2013 
 
Sogn og Fjordane Revisjon. 2008. "Terra og Vik kommune - Kva hende og kvifor 
hende det?".  
See PDF on CD 
 
Starling 1. 2007. “Series Prospects”. Starling Finance P.L.C. Series No: 2007-12  
See PDF on CD 
 
Starling 2. 2007. “Series Prospects”. Starling Finance P.L.C. Series No: 2007-13  
See PDF on CD 
 
Taylor, Mark, David A Peel and Lucio Sarno. 2001. “Non-linear mean reversion 
in real exchange rates: Towards a solution to the purchasing power parity puzzles” 
Centre for Economics Policy Research NO. 2658. 
See PDF on CD 
 
Vasicek, Oldric. 1977. “An equilibrium charaterization of the term structure” 
Journal of Finacnial Economics Vol 5 pages: 177-188 
 
Vose. 2013. “Geometric Brownian Motion models”. 
http://www.vosesoftware.com/ModelRiskHelp/index.htm#Time_series/Geometric
_Brownian_Motion_models.htm).  
Accessed May 20th 2013 
 
